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I. INTRODUCTION
Proxy contests1 have reemerged recently as an important part of
the market for corporate control.2 After years of indifference to corpo-
1. This Article focuses on proxy contests for corporate control. In a proxy contest for corpo-
rate control, shareholders try to wrest control of a target corporation from the existing board of
directors by winning a corporate election of directors. Issue contests, by comparison, are proxy
contests over fundamental corporate changes, such as merger proposals or charter amendments, or
proxy solicitations relating to shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8. Lucian A. Bebchuk and
Marcel Kahan, Proxy Contests, A Framework For Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Con-
tests, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1071, 1074-1075 (1990). This Article will use the term proxy contests to mean
proxy contests for corporate control. It will use the term joint offer to refer to a joint tender offer
and proxy contest.
2. See id. at 1075 (saying that "proxy contests have reemerged as an important tool for ac-
quiring control" of corporations); Ronald J. Gilson, Lilli A. Gordon and John Pound, How the
Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of
Directors, 17 J. Corp. L. 29, 31 (1991) (saying that "[t]here is a growing recognition that proxy
contests are important"); Robert J. Klein, The Case For Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the
Shareholders' Franchise Right, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 129, 137 (1991) (saying that "[t]he market for
corporate control in the post-poison pill era must ultimately rely on the shareholders' right to elect
their agents"). See also John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight,
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rate elections, dissident shareholders have turned once again to the bal-
lot box as a means of removing unwanted management.3 In a
surprisingly large number of these battles, the challengers have suc-
ceeded in getting all or much of what they wanted."
The resurgence of proxy contests has sparked renewed interest by
incumbent managements in developing powerful new defensive tactics
in corporate elections.5 Incumbents' time-honored campaign strategies,
such as switching the annual shareholders' meeting date, or restricting
the potential candidates who can run for office, are no longer sufficient
to ensure a management victory. In their place incumbents have substi-
tuted more drastic measures, such as Rights Plans,' popularly referred
20 J. Fin. Econ. 237 (1988); John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC: Democratic Ideals Versus
Market Efficiency, 29 J. Fin. Econ. 241 (1991).
3. See Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1073-74. After a rapid rise in the number of
proxy contests in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number of proxy contests declined modestly
in 1992. Proxy Season Ends Quietly, Institutional Investor, Inc. 6 (June 15, 1992).
4. Georgeson & Company, Inc., Proxy Contest Study, October 1984 to September 1990 (Dec.
14, 1990). This report found that while incumbents experienced total victory in over 40% of the
proxy contests for corporate control, compared to challengers' 28% complete victory percentage,
dissidents obtained some benefit from their proxy solicitation in a majority of these contests. Id. at
1. In fact, "[i]f we consider contests in which challengers won the vote, together with negotiated
settlements during or after the contest and other developments within one year, challengers
achieved significant advances toward their objectives or gained other benefits for themselves and
other shareholders in 74% of all control contests." Id. at 5.
5. For example, Time, Inc.'s management devised a powerful antitakeover measure directed
toward the use of the proxy fight: if dissidents replaced five of the 27 member Time board of
directors, then the equity of the common shareholders would be diluted significantly. Gilson,
Gordon, and Pound, 17 J. Corp. L. at 29 (cited in note 2). A second example of these powerful new
defensive tactics is the new Pennsylvania antitakeover statute. At the request of management in-
terests, the drafters designed the statute to discourage explicitly proxy contests and to forbid the
use of discretionary proxies by dissident shareholder groups. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 275 (Purdon
1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws At Proxy Contests, 1992 Wis. L.
Rev. 1071, 1093-95.
6. Rights Plans generally take the following form: The corporation distributes to its common
shareholders a dividend in the form of a new class of convertible preferred stock. The board of
directors determines the terms of the stock pursuant to a "blank check" provision in the certificate
of incorporation that permits the board to authorize this class of stock with unstated terms that
the board would fill in at the time of the stock's issuance. This new stock, or right, becomes con-
vertible into valuable securities if a hostile acquirer takes certain actions. The Rights Plan threat-
ens massive financial penalties to the acquirer if it proceeds with a hostile acquisition.
Rights Plans are one of the most powerful antitakeover defenses available to a target com-
pany. They were developed originally to deter two-tiered, front-end-loaded tender offers that co-
erced shareholders into tendering into the offer for fear of receiving a poor price for their shares in
the back end of the transaction. Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985). Subsequently, their use has spread to precluding shareholders from accepting all-cash, all-
shares, premium-priced tender offers. See Part II.B. for further discussion of Rights Plans and
their impact on proxy contests.
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to as "poison pills," that sharply limit, or even eliminate, shareholders'
ability to elect the directors of their choice.7
Should judges permit incumbents to use these powerful defensive
tactics to thwart dissident shareholders' efforts to unseat existing man-
agers? This Article argues that the courts have mistakenly favored in-
cumbents in resolving conflicts between incumbents' desire to use
defensive tactics to protect themselves and target company sharehold-
ers from "harmful" proxy contests, and the shareholders' need to have
an effective mechanism for replacing unwanted (and inefficient)
managers.
This is particularly clear in the lenient judicial review of the use of
Rights Plans, a critical defensive tactic, in proxy contests. Rights Plans
are especially important defensive tactics because they can be imple-
mented quickly by a target company's board of directors without share-
holder approval, may completely preclude stockholders from accepting
a tender offer, and, if triggered, impose no direct cost on other share-
holders." If a board of directors can use a Rights Plans to eliminate
effectively shareholders' ability to remove incumbents through the elec-
tion process, then shareholders will have lost control of their
corporation.
The arguments made in favor of using Rights Plans (and other de-
fensive tactics) in proxy contests are weak. Several of them rest on in-
valid assumptions about shareholder apathy and lack of information.9
Others mistakenly claim that proxy contests are not an important
method of disciplining corporate management. 10 Further, these argu-
7. Other important new defensive tactics include the sale of large blocks of stock to friendly
third parties and to employees through an employee stock option plan ("ESOP"), see Shamrock
Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. 1989), and new powerful state antitakeover
statutes that prohibit the voting of discretionary proxies cast for dissidents. See Committee for
New Management of Guaranty Bancshares Corp. v. Dimeling, 772 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(interpreting the new Pennsylvania antitakeover statute).
8. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1946
(1991). A variety of other less powerful defensive tactics exist, including classified boards of direc-
tors, changes of annual meeting dates, dual class stock recapitalizations, elimination of cumulative
voting, advance notice of director nomination by-laws, and advance notice of business by-laws. For
further discussion of these defensive tactics, see Irwin H. Warren and Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving
Standards of Judicial Review of Procedural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 Bus. Law. 647 (1992);
Bainbridge, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. at 1071 (cited in note 5).
9. See notes 133-65 and accompanying text for discussion of these arguments.
10. Corporate elections are an important method of disciplining inefficient or incompetent
managers. Existing empirical research shows that positive stock price increases are associated with
proxy contests. The costs of proxy contests appear to offset only partially these benefits. See notes
166-89 and accompanying text for further discussion.
Shareholder voice may also serve as a mechanism to eliminate unwanted antitakeover de-
fenses, such as the Rights Plan. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice
and Game Theoretic Approach, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347, 347-48 (1991). For example, in 1990, 33
companies received shareholder-sponsored poison pill initiatives that called for the redemption of
[Vol. 46:503
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ments attach little weight to the shareholders' need to have a means of
removing unwanted incumbents.11 In pragmatic terms, permitting the
use of Rights Plans against proxy contests may virtually eliminate
shareholders' ability to express their dissatisfaction effectively.2
Given that the justifications for allowing the use of Rights Plans
against dissident proxy campaigns are, at best, weak, what standard
should judges apply to decide when their use is permissible? Under cur-
rent law, judges examine the threats posed by a proxy contest to the
corporation, and look at the reasonableness of the target company
board's response to that threat, to decide whether they should permit
incumbents' defensive tactics. The courts generally have deferred to
management's decisions to employ Rights Plans.
Courts should revise the current judicial balancing tests for defen-
sive tactics in proxy contests, such as Rights Plans, to better protect
shareholder voting rights. Courts must severly limit the range of threats
that management can claim are posed by a proxy contest to a com-
pany's shareholders. Judges should assess the reasonableness of incum-
bents' responses to these threats based on the defensive tactics' impact
on a dissident's chances of winning a proxy contest. The law ought to
prohibit certain features of Rights Plans that preclude successful proxy
contests. With other less restrictive aspects of Rights Plans (and other
defensive tactics), incumbents should have the burden of persuading
the court that tangible benefits conferred upon shareholders justify the
negative impacts of defensive tactics.
This Article begins by describing the structure of Rights Plans,
their impact on proxy contests, and the courts' attempts to determine
when and how incumbents can use Rights Plans in a proxy contest. The
next section analyzes the theoretical importance of the shareholder
franchise and the arguments for allowing a board of directors to use
defensive tactics in proxy contests. It critiques claims that the best in-
the poison pill or for submission of its use to a shareholder vote. See Klein, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 134
(cited in note 2).
11. The decline of the tender offer, and the increased usage of "index" investing, sharply
limit the ability of many shareholders, especially large institutional ones, to sell their shares.
Gordon, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 347-48 (cited in note 10). Large institutional shareholders frequently
invest their funds in equity markets by purchasing a basket of stocks that reflect an underlying
stock index, such as the Standard and Poor's 500 or the Dow Jones industrial index. These institu-
tions then hold these shares over the long term to insure that the institution's financial perform-
ance matches that of the index and that their transaction costs are low.
12. Incumbents could safely ignore shareholder "voice" in corporate decisionmaking if they
knew that their jobs at a corporation were protected completely. Without a credible threat that
shareholders could subject intransigent management to removal if they did not improve their per-
formance, many of the benefits of institutional investors' monitoring of corporate managers un-
doubtedly would disappear. See notes 122-26 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
point.
19931
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vand. L. Rev.  507 1993
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:503
terests of shareholders and society warrant the use of defensive tactics
in proxy contests. The final section of the Article argues in favor of
revising existing tests for evaluating incumbents' use of Rights Plans in
proxy contests.
II. RIGHTS PLANS: DEFENSIVE TACTICS THAT IMPACT SHAREHOLDER
VOTING RIGHTS
Proxy contests are not a new method of gaining control of a corpo-
ration. In the 1950s and 1960s, proxy contests were the most effective
way for shareholders to remove unwanted management.18
By the early 1970s, however, the tender offer had displaced the
proxy contest as the preferred change of control mechanism. 14 Tender
offers were easier to win than proxy contests because shareholders were
more willing to sell their shares to unknown dissident shareholders than
to agree to vote for them in an election. This was particularly true when
management was painting the dissidents as self-interested raiders. For
the next two decades, the proxy contest languished.
Recently, the attraction of the tender offer alone as a method of
forcing out unwanted management has fallen dramatically.1 5 State leg-
islatures and the courts have provided directors with access to a defen-
13. Edward R. Aranow and Herbert A. Einhorn, Proxy Contests For Corporate Control 3
(Columbia, 1968). Before the advent of the tender offer, the shareholders' only other alternative
was to ask the directors to remove incumbent management, something that boards were reluctant
to do. In recent years, outside directors have become more militant about removing incumbent
chief executive officers of poorly performing companies at the request of large shareholders. See
Elisabeth Holtzman, When Management Falls Down On The Job, Pension Funds Can Put Inde-
pendent Directors On The Board, Washington Post A17 (May 26, 1992). See also John Pound,
After Takeovers, Quiet Diplomacy, Wall St. J. A10 (June 8, 1992).
14. Professor Loss summarized the reasons for the rise of the tender offer and the relative
decline in the usage of proxy contests as follows: (1) Prior to 1968, when the Williams Act was
enacted, no federal regulation of tender offers remotely comparable to the proxy rules existed
(with the exceptions of several provisions of the Bank Holding Act and the Investment Company
Act regulating the purchase of securities); (2) this lack of regulation allowed a hostile acquirer to
catch management by surprise; (3) an acquirer could extend the offer for a limited period of time,
preventing management from building up defenses and minimizing its cost; (4) the tender offer
investment resulted in an investment as well as the purchase of control; and (5) if the tender offer
was not successful, the bidder usually could dispose of its stake without a loss, or at a profit, to the
target or a third-party acquirer of the target. Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation
498 (Little Brown, 2d ed. 1988). Another important reason why tender offers are preferable to
proxy contests is that the corporate acquirer obtains most of the benefit of his or her efforts in
reforming the corporation, whereas in a proxy contest other shareholders get to free-ride on the
efforts of the dissident. Ronald J. Gilson and Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corpo-
rate Acquisitions 598 (Supp. 1992).
15. Warren and Abrams, 47 Bus. Law. at 647-48 (cited in note 8). Tight credit and the col-
lapse of the junk bond market contributed to the decline of the tender offer and the increased
popularity of the proxy contest. The junk bond market's difficulties have limited severely the abil-
ity of potential acquirers to finance tender offers at the above-market prices needed to succeed.
The current economic recession and banking crisis have increased further the difficulty of raising
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sive arsenal, including the Rights Plan, capable of defeating a naked
tender offer.16 The decline of the tender offer, and an increased level of
activism by institutional stockholders, " breathed new life into the
proxy contest."8 In particular, the joint tender offer and proxy contest
has become popular, 19 especially when the Rights Plan of the target
company does not include a "continuing director" provision,20 or when
the pertinent state antitakeover statute permits the newly elected di-
rectors to exempt the dissident's proposed transaction from the Rights
Plan's reach.2 '
With the increased popularity of proxy contests came renewed
managerial attention to defenses against dissident electoral challenges.
sufficient financing for heavily leveraged acquisitions. Bainbridge, 1992 Wisc. L. Rev. at 1073 (cited
in note 5).
16. The "just say no" defense, a combination of a Rights Plan and a tough state antitakeover
statute, is lethal to most acquirers' attempts to appeal directly to the target's shareholders through
a tender offer with the intent of gaining control of the company. This defense appears to have been
judicially sanctioned in the Delaware courts' recent decisions about Rights Plans. See, for example,
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). The United States
Supreme Court's decisions upholding strong state antitakeover statutes appear to have approved
those defenses as well. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corporation of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
See also Gordon, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 347 (cited in note 10).
17. The increased power and militancy of institutional shareholders on corporate governance
issues has drawn scholarly attention to the possibility of true shareholder participation in the man-
agement and control of corporations. See generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents:
The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black,
The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 895
(1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520 (1990); Edward
B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Ge-
orgetown L. J. 445 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Inves-
tor As Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L.
Rev. 863 (1991); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Delegation and Initiative in Corporate Law: A Game Theo-
retic Approach to Problems of Shareholders and Managers, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 305 (1991).
18. Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1082 (cited in note 1). Proxy contests also have
two inherent advantages over tender offers. First, proxy contests generally have lower transaction
costs than hostile takeovers. Second, "the changes in property rights involved in hostile takeovers
can distort shareholder choice of whether to sell shares to a raider" because of free-rider problems
or pressures on shareholders to tender their shares when they might not otherwise choose to do so.
Id. Antitakeover tactics also tend to be stronger for hostile takeovers than those currently permit-
ted in proxy contests.
19. See Warren and Abrams, 47 Bus. Law. at 648-49 n.10 (cited in note 8), for a list of the
most prominent joint offers of 1990 and 1991. These authors also note that disgruntled investors
increasingly use the proxy mechanism in attempts to force corporations to sell, liquidate, or
restructure themselves. Id. at 649 n.11.
20. If the Rights Plan contains a "continuing director" provision, then only persons who were
directors prior to a specified event can vote to alter the Rights Plan. When no such provision is in
the Rights Plan, the dissident shareholder's "initial objective may be to install directors who will
rescind the plan or redeem the target company's shareholder rights." Id. at 650.
21. Id.
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Incumbents quickly realized the Rights Plan's value as a defensive tac-
tic against dissident proxy campaigns.
A. The Mechanics of Rights Plans
Almost one-half of America's major public companies have Rights
Plans, and the rest could put them in place quickly if desired. Most
plans are authorized expressly by state corporate codes. 22 While a vari-
ety of different plans have been dubbed Rights Plans, the Share
Purchase Rights Plan is the most popular.2 To illustrate some of the
common characteristics of this type of Rights Plan, the next footnote
briefly summarizes the Apple Bancorp Rights Plan.2'
A target company's board of directors usually creates a Rights Plan
without a shareholder vote. The board authorizes the creation and dis-
tribution to its common stockholders of a dividend of one right for each
share of common stock they own. The right entitles the shareholder to
purchase common or preferred stock of the target company or any po-
tential acquirer. Initially the rights are transferable only with the stock
and are not exercisable. However, once a "triggering event" occurs, such
22. In roughly one-half of the states, the corporate code expressly permits Rights Plans.
Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 550 n. 97 (cited in note 17). The courts in most other states have upheld
poison pills. Id.
23. Martin Lipton and Erica Steinberger, 1 Takeovers and Freezeouts § 6.03[4][a] at 6-57
(1988). For a more detailed description of Rights Plans and the law surrounding them, see id.
24. The following summary of the terms of the Apple Bancorp Rights Plan is taken from 1
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual 1602 (1990):
APPLE BANCORP'S RIGHTS PLAN
Shareholders Rights Plan: In Nov., 1989 the Board of Directors adopted a Shareholder
Rights Plan and declared a dividend of one preferred share purchase right ("Right") for each
outstanding share of common stock of Bancorp. Each right will enable the holder thereof to
buy a one-hundredth interest in a share of a new series of preferred stock of Bancorp at an
exercise price of $1.35. Initially, the rights will not be exerciseable and will transfer with and
only with the shares of common stock. The rights will be exerciseable and separately transfer-
able twenty business days after a person or group of persons acquires generally 15% or more
of Bancorp's common stock, or twenty business days, or such later date as may be determined
by the Board of Directors, after a person or group announces a tender offer the consummation
of which would result in ownership by a person or group of persons of generally 15% or more
of the common stock.
If a person or group of persons becomes an Acquiring Person, otherwise than pursuant to
a cash tender offer for all shares in which such person or group increases its stake to 80% or
more of the outstanding shares of common stock, each Right will entitle its holder (other than
such person or members of such group) to purchase, at the then-current purchase price of the
Right, a number of shares of common stock of Apple Bancorp, Inc. having a market value
twice the purchase price of the Right. Additionally, if Bancorp is acquired in a merger or
other business combination transaction, each Right will entitle its holder to purchase, at the
then-current purchase price of the Right, a number of shares of common stock of the acquir-
ing company having a market value at that time of twice the purchase price of the Right.
Subject to certain limitations, Bancorp's Board of Directors may reduce the 15% threshold,
but not to less than 10%....
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vand. L. Rev.  510 1993
1993] DEFENSIVE TACTICS
as the acquisition of more than a specified percentage of the target
company's stock, 5 new rights certificates are distributed to the target
company's stockholders and these certificates become exercisable.2 6
If the acquirer buys more than the specified percentage of stock,
and then acquires the remaining target company stock in a merger, or
other business combination transaction, the "flip-over" 27 provisions of
the Rights Plan allow the holders of the rights certificates, other than
the acquirer, to buy the acquirer's common stock at a fifty percent dis-
count.28 Most Rights Plans also have a "flip-in"2 9 provision that permits
the holders of the rights certificates, except the acquirer, to purchase
shares of the target company at half price if the acquirer purchases
more than a certain percentage of the target company's stock.30 If either
25. The definition of a triggering event can vary between Rights Plans. One common defini-
tion is "the earlier of ten days after an entity acquires a certain percentage of the issuer's stock
(typically 20%) or commences a tender offer that would result in the acquiring person (the bidder)
owning a certain percentage of the issuer's stock (typically 30%)." Anthony Augliera, Shareholder
Rights Plans: Saying No to Inadequate Tender Offers, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 803, 808 n.33 (1989).
26. The Apple Bancorp Rights Plan terms are reported in Moody's to be as follows:
Initially, the rights will not be exerciseable and will transfer with and only with the shares of
common stock. The rights will be exerciseable and separately transferable twenty business
days after a person or group of persons acquires generally 15% or more of Bancorp's common
stock, or twenty business days, or such later date as may be determined by the Board of
Directors, after a person or group announces a tender offer the consummation of which would
result in ownership by a person or group of persons of generally 15% or more of the common
stock.
1 Moody's Bank and Finance Manual at 1602 (cited in note 24).
27. Lipton and Steinberger, 1 Takeovers and Freezeouts § 6.0314][a] at 6-57 (cited in note
23). See also Augliera, 57 Fordham L. Rev. at 808-09 (cited in note 25). This adversely affects the
acquiring companies' stockholders by diluting their equity interest in their company. Id.
Flip-over provisions do not stop an acquirer from buying a controlling, but not 100%, stake in
a company because the flip-over provision does not kick in unless the acquirer attempts to engage
in a business combination with the target company. Id.
28. The Apple Bancorp Rights Plan flip-over provisions provide that:
if Bancorp is acquired in a merger or other business combination transaction, each Right will
entitle its holder to purchase, at the then-current purchase price of the Right, a number of
shares of common stock of the acquiring company having a market value at that time of twice
the purchase price of the Right.
1 Moody's Bank and Finance Manual at 1602.
29. Lipton and Steinberger, 1 Takeovers and Freezeouts § 6.0314][a] at 6-57. The flip-in
provision operates to increase substantially the shares the bidder must acquire and makes an ac-
quisition far more expensive because it dilutes the investment and voting power of an acquiring
entity. Augliera, 57 Fordham L. Rev. at 808 (cited in note 25).
30. The Apple Bancorp Rights Plan flip-in provisions provide:
If a person or group of persons becomes an Acquiring Person, otherwise than pursuant to
a cash tender offer for all shares in which such person or group increases its stake to 80% or
more of the outstanding shares of common stock, each Right will entitle its holder (other than
such person or members of such group) to purchase, at the then-current purchase price of the
Right, a number of shares of common stock of Apple Bancorp, Inc. having a market value
twice the purchase price of the Right.
1 Moody's Bank and Finance Manual at 1602.
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of the flip-in or flip-over provisions is triggered, the target company's
shareholders will find that the rights are valuable and exercise them.
The cost to the bidder of acquiring the target company is thus greatly
increased, and the hostile takeover deterred.
The board of directors of the target company reserves the power to
redeem, or buy back, the rights for a certain period of time at a nominal
price.3 1 This gives the board tremendous negotiating leverage with the
bidder: if the bidder agrees to the board's terms, the board can stop the
rights from becoming redeemable, avert the economic devastation that
would be inflicted on the bidder, and permit the bidder to acquire the
target company.3 2 If the bidder does not agree to accept the board's
demands, then the directors can, in many circumstances, use the Rights
Plan to defeat the tender offer.
B. The Impact of Rights Plans on Proxy Contests
For a dissident shareholder group to win a proxy contest for corpo-
rate control, the shareholder group must either purchase enough voting
shares to vote itself into office, or persuade enough other shareholders
to vote for the dissident slate so that it obtains a majority of the votes
cast in the election. An effective Rights Plan puts important obstacles
in the way of both routes.
The Rights Plan's flip-in and flip-over features stop individual
shareholders or shareholder groups from accumulating large amounts of
the target company's stock. No potential acquirer or other shareholder
will risk triggering a Rights Plan by accumulating more than the
threshold level of shares because of the threat of massive discriminatory
dilution. The trigger level therefore effectively sets a ceiling on the
amount of stock that any shareholder can accumulate before launching
a proxy contest.
The lower the threshold level, the greater the negative impact on a
dissident group's ability to accumulate the company's stock. The most
common trigger level for Rights Plans is twenty percent, but some plans
go as low as ten percent. The current trend appears to be toward lower-
ing the threshold level in newly created or amended Rights Plans. 3 3
31. Augliera, 57 Fordham L. Rev. at 809 (cited in note 25). For example, the Apple Bancorp
Rights Plan provides in part that "at any time prior to the date a person or group of persons
becomes an Acquiring Person, a majority of the directors of Bancorp may vote to redeem the
Rights for one cent per Right." 1 Moody's Bank and Finance Manual at 1602 (cited in note 24).
32. See Moran v. Household International, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). See Part II.C.2.a. for further discussion of the Moran decisions.
33. See Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 551 n.100 (cited in note 17). Some courts have shown
hostility toward very low trigger levels, finding them to be excessive in relation to investors' need
for protection. See, for example, Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 259 (7th
Cir. 1986) (invalidating a Rights Plan with a 15% trigger level).
[Vol. 46:503
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vand. L. Rev.  512 1993
DEFENSIVE TACTICS
Boards also can act rapidly to lower the threshold level if a large
shareholder emerges.34 For instance, if a dissident shareholder begins
accumulating stock in preparation for a proxy contest, and files a
Schedule 13D announcing that it has crossed the five percent level, the
target company's board of directors could drop its Rights Plan's thresh-
old from twenty percent to ten percent as quickly as it could call a
directors' meeting to approve the change.15 Furthermore, many Rights
Plans permit dropping the threshold limit retroactively if the target
company's board of directors declares the dissident to be an "adverse
person."36
When dissident shareholder groups try to convince other share-
holders to vote for them, the Rights Plan throws up several obstacles.
For example, in most Rights Plans, all shares held by a "beneficial
owner" are counted toward the maximum number of shares that can be
held without crossing the threshold level. A shareholder group is con-
sidered to be the beneficial owner of any stock that it has the right to
vote, either directly or indirectly, except pursuant to revocable proxies
given in response to public solicitations that the SEC has reviewed.37
This beneficial ownership definition precludes dissident shareholders
from entering into agreements with other shareholders concerning the
reimbursement of their proxy contest expenses or about the slate of
candidates they intend to nominate for directors.3
Rights Plans also give the target companies' boards of directors
considerable discretion to determine who among the shareholders
should be considered members of a shareholder group.39 The uncer-
tainty surrounding who the board will determine to be the members of
a shareholder group, and how many shares the board will determine
should be attributed to them, places a significant burden on dissident
shareholder groups.
Rights Plans can create other, more direct impediments to share-
holder proxy solicitations. Incumbent boards have used a Rights Plan
to stop potential group members from communicating with one an-
34. Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 551 (cited in note 17).
35. See, for example, In re Chrysler Corporation Shareholders Litigation, No. 11873, 1992
Del. Ch. LEXIS 152 (July 27, 1992) (noting that the board reduced Rights Plan trigger level from
20% to 10% after potential bidder for company purchased 9.8% of the company's stock).
36. See Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 551 n.101 (cited in note 17).
37. See id. at 551; Warren and Abrams, 47 Bus. Law. at 663 (cited in note 8). Beneficial
ownership is defined using the Rule 13D definition. See id. at 663. This definition is drafted loosely
enough to permit incumbents to interpret expansively its language to cover a wide variety of
situations.
38. See In re Chrysler Corporation Shareholders Litigation, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 152, at
*9-17 (recognizing that Rights Plans deter collective action by shareholders in proxy contests).
39. See Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 551.
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other. In one case, two large shareholders could not even discuss the
possibility of launching a proxy contest under the terms of the target
company's Rights Plan.40 In another case, the target company's poison
pill retirement plan prevented shareholders from accepting more than
35% of the revocable proxies cast in an election.41 This would have
stopped anyone from successfully waging a proxy contest.
The importance of a Rights Plan in a proxy contest is well-illus-
trated by the aborted 1991 proxy contest for Avon launched by
Chartwell Associates and Argonaut Partners. In 1990, Chartwell, Argo-
naut, and some affiliated entities (the "Chartwell Group") launched a
proxy contest to elect four directors, one-third of the classified board of
Avon. The Chartwell Group settled this contest in exchange for two
seats on the Avon board and the formation of a board committee to
study ways of maximizing shareholder value.42
The Chartwell Group continued accumulating Avon shares. By
1991 it held 19.8% of Avon's total voting shares.43 Avon earlier had
amended its Rights Plan to drop its threshold level to twenty percent,
effectively stopping the Chartwell Group from accumulating more than
that amount of stock without triggering the Rights Plan.44 With the
1991 Avon annual shareholders' meeting approaching, Argonaut Part-
ners, which held three percent of Avon's stock, announced that it had
withdrawn from the Chartwell Group.45 The remaining members of the
Chartwell Group claimed that this reduced its percentage ownership of
Avon stock ownership to 16.8%, giving it room to purchase another
3.1% of Avon's stock before the 1991 annual meeting.
Avon promptly filed suit against Argonaut and the Chartwell
Group claiming that the two remained members of the same share-
40. See Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., C.A. No. 9569 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 11, 1988), in which the potential target of a proxy contest reduced the existing flip-in trigger
of a Rights Plan from 50% to 20% to prevent two large shareholders who collectively owned 21%
of the target company's stock from joining together in a proxy solicitation effort to remove man-
agement. Although the incumbent board subsequently amended the Rights Plan to allow the two
shareholders to communicate with one another, the vice chancellor criticized the incumbents' use
of the Rights Plan in this manner.
41. Sutton Holding Corp. v. Desoto, Inc., No. 12051, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 85 (May 14, 1991)
(invalidating this provision of a Rights Plan).
42. See Judi Perlman, Chartwell to Solicit Proxies to Gain Control Of Avon Board, Reuter
Business Report (Jan. 31, 1991); William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make A Big Difference?, Harv.
Bus. Rev. 70 (Sept./Oct. 1990). •
43. See Chartwell Raises Avon Stake, Women's Wear Daily 15 (Aug. 9, 1990).
44. In an earlier amendment to its Rights Plan, Avon had attempted to lower the threshold
level of its pill below the 20% level. Chartwell sued and the federal court enjoined this change as a
violation of New York corporate law forbidding discrimination among shareholders holding less
than 20% of a company's stock. Avon Products, Inc. v. Chartwell Associates, L.P., 738 F. Supp.
686 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aft'd, 907 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1990).
45. Perlman, Reuter Business Report (cited in note 42).
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holder group under the terms of Avon's Rights Plan and that any fur-
ther purchases of Avon stock by either one would trigger the Rights
Plan." Shortly after Avon filed this litigation, Chartwell sold off all but
3.5% of its Avon stake. Before the 1991 annual meeting was held, the
two sides settled the suit, with Avon the clear winner.
The negative impact of Avon's Rights Plan on the Chartwell
Group's proxy contest is apparent. The Chartwell Group could not
purchase more than the Rights Plan's threshold level of Avon stock di-
rectly, nor could it act in unison with other shareholders to oust incum-
bent management if collectively the group's members would hold more
than the threshold limit. Avon's ability to bring litigation claiming that,
for the purposes of its Rights Plan, the Chartwell Group continued to
exist, hurt the dissidents' efforts to attract new members or to purchase
more stock themselves, although it did not stop them from receiving
revocable proxies from other shareholders.
The impediments that Rights Plans create against effective dissi-
dent shareholder action in a proxy contest would not be so severe if the
courts limited their scope. In fact, the courts have been slow to strike
down any of the obstacles to shareholder action created by Rights
Plans.
C. Judicial Review of Incumbents' Use of Rights Plans
1. Paramount and Judicial Deference to Using Rights Plans Against
Tender Offers
Under Delaware law, directors have a fiduciary duty to protect the
corporation from harm. This duty requires them to resist takeovers that
they reasonably perceive are not in the corporation's and its sharehold-
ers' best interests.48 In the proper circumstances, the board of directors
could satisfy these duties by keeping a Rights Plan in place, thereby
precluding its shareholders from accepting an acquirer's tender offer.
The board's exercise of its fiduciary duties in deciding to use a Rights
Plan to stop a potential acquisition is subject to judicial review under a
balancing test first announced in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum.49
46. Chartwell Associates Files Counterclaim Against Avon, PR Newswire (Jan. 31, 1991).
47. Pierre Belec, Avon Says Chartwell Signs Truce, Ending Boardroom Battle, Reuter Busi-
ness Report (Apr. 2, 1991). The terms of the settlement required Chartwell to sign a ten-year
standstill agreement and drop its fight to obtain more board seats in the 1991 elections in ex-
change for payment of its legal fees and expenses and Avon's agreement to allow the two current
Chartwell directors to remain on its board.
48. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
49. Id. at 954. Although developed by the Delaware courts, many other states have followed
the Unocal test. See, for example, Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F.
Supp. 984, 1009 (E.D. Wisc. 1989) (applying Wisconsin law), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496
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Unocal applies heightened judicial review to the board's decision
not to redeem a poison pill, or to use any other defensive tactic, because
of the "omnipresent specter" that the directors might be acting in their
own self-interest to preserve their jobs.50 The Unocal test is two
pronged: first, the board must show that it has reasonable grounds to
believe that a threat to the corporation exists; and second, the directors
must show that the defensive measure enacted is "reasonable" in rela-
tion to the threat posed by the attempted takeover.5 1 The Delaware
Chancery Court has applied this test to invalidate defensive tactics on
several occasions.52 However, the Delaware Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.5 1 strongly sug-
gests that when a corporation has a preexisting business plan, a target
company's board of directors can use a Rights Plan to bar its share-
holders from accepting a hostile tender offer. 4
The Delaware Supreme Court's Paramount decision expands in
two directions the powers of a target company's board to reject a hostile
tender offer: first, it enlarges the permissible range of threats that a
board can point to in the first prong of the Unocal test; and second, it
sharply cuts back on the scope of judicial review of the directors' asser-
tion that a threat exists.5 5 With regard to the first point, prior chancery
court case law had limited the threat that an all cash, all shares tender
offer posed to simple economic inadequacy. The chancery court re-
(7th Cir. 1989); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn. 1986) (applying
Minnesota law), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987). Recently, some states
have adopted statutes that prohibit the application of the Unocal standard in reviewing actions by
the boards of their domestic corporations. See, for example, Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-35-1 (Burns
1992); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1715 (Purdon 1991).
50. 493 A.2d at 954.
51. Id. at 955. For an in-depth analysis of the Unocal proportionality test, see Ronald J.
Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is
There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. Law. 247 (1989). See also James F. Ritter,
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 Va. L. Rev. 851 (1986); Jan Jenson, Discrimination
Against Shareholders in Opposing a Hostile Takeover, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1319 (1986); Augliera, 57
Fordham L. Rev. at 803 (cited in note 25).
52. See, for example, Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988);
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986). In several cases,
the Delaware Chancery Court ordered the redemption of a poison pill. See, for example, City Capi-
tal Associates v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Grand Metropolitan Public, Ltd. v.
The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988). In both Interco and Pillsbury, the chancery
court found that it could define the threat to shareholder interests posed by an all cash, all shares
hostile tender offer by answering the question of whether the shareholders would receive an ade-
quate and fair price. Gordon, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1939 (cited in note 8).
53. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
54. Gordon, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1932, 1941, 1947. Gordon offers three alternative explana-
tions of the Paramount decision: an economic analysis, a public choice analysis, and a socio-histor-
ical analysis. He argues that a socio-historical analysis of the dangers of unbridled takeover
activity provides the most coherent explanation for the Delaware Supreme Court's decision.
55. Id. at 1941.
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stricted incumbents' response to this threat to a temporary deferral of
shareholders' right to choose to accept a tender offer by, for example,
allowing a Rights Plan to remain in place for a limited period of time.
Paramount explicitly rejected this limitation and greatly expanded the
list of potential threats that a board could consider under the first
prong of Unocal.5 e
Paramount also shifts the standard for judicial review of the direc-
tors' determination that a threat exists away from the independent ju-
dicial determination emphasized by prior chancery court decisions and
toward a more lenient business judgment type standard. Indeed, when a
board acts in good faith and after reasonable investigation, Paramount
suggests there is "no place for the court's independent assessment of
the board's assertion that a hostile bid presents a series of threats that
warrant a preclusive response. 5 7 This would seem to be true even when
the defensive tactic applied, such as the Rights Plan, completely pre-
cludes the shareholders from choosing to accept a tender offer.58 In
short, Paramount may mark the collapse of heightened judicial scrutiny
for takeover defensive tactics against hostile tender offers and a retreat
to their deferential review under the business judgment rule. 9
56. Id. at 1942.
57. Id. at 1943. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, did condemn "management actions
that are coercive in nature or force upon shareholders a management-sponsored alternative to a
hostile offer." Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154.
58. Gordon, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1937 n.21 (cited in note 8). The Chancery Court in Para-
mount carefully distinguished the poison pill, which it called a "control mechanism," from other
defensive tactics that might have "independent business purposes," in deciding whether a target
company board's response was proportionate to the threat posed by a tender offer. Id. at 1940. The
Delaware Supreme Court drew no such distinction, apparently sanctioning the use of the poison
pill as a proportionate response in a wide variety of circumstances. See id. at 1946.
59. Id. at 1945-47. In other words, the Delaware Supreme Court "seems to have abandoned
the effort to subject defensive tactics in hostile takeovers to serious scrutiny, backing away from
several recent precedents and undermining a sophisticated developing jurisprudence in the Chan-
cery Court." Id. at 1947.
19931
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2. Judicial Review of Rights Plans' Application in Proxy Contests
a. Proxy Contests and Rights Plans: Moran v. Household
International
Judicial inquiry60 into the impact of a flip-over Rights Plan on in-
surgent's proxy contest efforts61 began in Moran v. Household Interna-
tional.62 In that case, a substantial shareholder of the company who was
not actively engaged in an effort to acquire the company challenged the
validity of Household International's Rights Plan, one of the first
Rights Plans put into place. The chancery court asked two questions:
first, did the Rights Plan materially affect dissident shareholders' abil-
ity to win a proxy contest?; and second, if such an effect existed, was
the application of the Rights Plan justifiable as part of a policy of de-
terring hostile takeovers? In answering the first question, the chancery
court recognized that the Rights Plan's prohibitions would stop dissi-
dent shareholders from accumulating blocks of the target company's
stock. However, based on a very thin statistical record, 6  the court
60. Prior to Moran, the courts used the test set out in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,
285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), to determine the validity of defensive tactics in proxy contests. Schnell
stopped management from impeding dissidents' efforts to wage a proxy contest when the incum-
bents acted "for the purpose of perpetuating [themselves] in office; and ... for the purpose of
obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to under-
take a proxy contest against management." Id. at 439. Schnell requires a judicial finding that the
incumbents' actions were taken "with a principal purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder
power through the vote." Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1122 (Del. Ch. 1990) ("Ap-
ple Bancorp I").
The Delaware courts continue to apply Schnell to defensive "actions by directors that pur-
posefully or otherwise result in the manipulation of the stockholders' voting rights... [subjecting
them] to strict judicial review." Warren and Abrams, 47 Bus. Law. at 652-53 (cited in note 8).
Virtually every decision based on Schnell stems from board action being deliberately employed to
frustrate or disenfrachise stockholders. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992). Although
Schnell's application results in careful scrutiny of incumbents' defensive actions, to date no court
has found that Schnell restricts incumbents' use of Rights Plans against proxy contests. Compare
Davis Acquisition, Inc. v. NWA, Inc., C.A. No. 10761, 1989 WL 40845 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1989)
(raising the issue but decided on other grounds). After the Delaware Supreme Court's recent opin-
ion in Stroud v. Grace, the Delaware courts will apply the Unocal test to determine the validity of
using Rights Plans in proxy contests. 606 A.2d at 92 n.3.
61. Moran involved a challenge to the validity of an early version of the Rights Plan, one
which contained only a flip-over provision. Even this older version of the Rights Plan created a
"proxy inhibition [that] arises because one of the events which trigger issuance of the [poison pill]
preferred is the formation of a group representing 20% of Household stock for the purpose of
conducting a proxy contest." Moran, 490 A.2d at 1079.
62. 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985).
63. The court relied exclusively on a report prepared by the defendants' proxy solicitors and
the testimony of one of the solicitors in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 1079. For a discussion of
why this evidence was inconclusive about the impact of Rights Plans on proxy contests, see Part
IV.B.
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found the claim that a Rights Plan would impede a dissident share-
holder's efforts to win a proxy contest to be "speculative. '6
In the second part of the chancery court's analysis, it found that
even if a Rights Plan negatively affected dissidents' efforts to win proxy
contests, it was designed to stop two-tiered tender offers and easily
could be circumvented and avoided if shareholders were allowed to
purchase more than twenty percent of the target company's stock. 5
When viewed as part of an overall policy adopted by the board to deter
hostile tender offers, the Chancery Court held that the negative effects
of the Rights Plan on a dissident's chances of winning a proxy contest
did not invalidate the Rights Plan." The Delaware Supreme Court sub-
sequently affirmed this decision.6 7
In short, Moran requires that a court look at the impact of a Rights
Plan on a dissident's election campaign and at the Rights Plan's place
in the company's program to defeat hostile tender offers.6 s Given the
weakness of the statistical evidence introduced in Moran, and the fact
that Household International's Rights Plan lacked a flip-in trigger, the
decision should not be viewed as having held conclusively that Rights
Plans have an immaterial effect on proxy contests.69 Indeed, when the
courts have found these effects to be very negative, they have invali-
dated the application of Rights Plans in proxy contests."
64. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1080.
65. Id. For the Rights Plan to accomplish its purpose, the 20% threshold level must extend
not only to individual holdings, but also to group holdings. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., C. A.
No. 11510, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 121 at *11 (Aug. 9, 1990) ("Apple Bancorp II")..
66. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1080.
67. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The Delaware Supreme Court
concluded that the evidence introduced at trial supported the chancery court's finding that the
Rights Plan would have a minimal effect on proxy contests. Id. It went on to reject the plaintiff's
contention that Household's Rights Plan would impermissibly burden shareholders seeking to con-
duct a proxy contest. Id.
68. Although Moran was decided before the Unocal decision, a court easily could analyze it
using Unocal's two part test. See Part H.C.2.c. for a discussion of the Apple Bancorp court's appli-
cation of both tests. The target company board could define the threat to the corporation, the first
part of the Unocal test, as the threat of a hostile takeover. The board's response to this threat,
installing a Rights Plan that has a negative impact on a dissident shareholder's chances of winning
a proxy contest, could be found to be reasonable if its effects on the shareholder's chances of
winning a proxy contest were immaterial.
69. See notes 232-46 and accompanying text for discussion of this point.
70. In Sutton Holdings Corp. v. Desoto, Inc., the chancellor determined that a poison retire-
ment plan, whose dilution provisions were triggered by a dissident's receipt of proxies for more
than 35% of the votes in an election of directors, precluded shareholders from succeeding in a
proxy contest. Sutton Holdings Corp. v. Desoto, Inc., No. 12051, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 85 at *2-3
(May 14, 1991). The negative impact of the poison retirement plan on any dissident's chances of
winning a proxy contest was clear: eliminating a dissident's ability to receive proxies destroys her
ability to win a proxy fight.
In another case, Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., C.A. No. 9569, 1988
Del. Ch. LEXIS 32 at *29-39 (April 18, 1988), the chancery court found that the application of a
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b. Apple Bancorp: Flip-In Pills in Joint Offers
While Moran showed how the courts would treat flip-over Rights
Plans' application to proxy contests, the advent of the more potent flip-
in Rights Plan provisions," and the rise of the joint offer,72 raised the
possibility that later courts might reevaluate Moran's conclusions about
the impact of Rights Plans on proxy contests. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp,
Inc.7 3 provided an opportunity for the chancery court to examine the
impact of the flip-in Rights Plan on a dissident's chances of winning a
joint offer.
Stanley Stahl, a thirty percent shareholder engaged in a joint offer
for the control of Apple Bancorp, claimed that Apple Bancorp's Rights
Plan's definition of beneficial ownership precluded him from forming
revocable shareholder voting agreements with other shareholders when
collectively they held more than the threshold level of shares.74 The in-
cumbent board agreed, but argued that these restrictions were neces-
sary to preserve its bargaining position with Stahl and to help it find a
third-party bidder.75
The court's strong language about the need to protect the share-
holder franchise seemed to promise that it would carefully scrutinize
Apple Bancorp's Rights Plan's restrictions.7 6 It found a strong "norma-
tive argument" against allowing "the side [controlling] the levers of
power [to] employ them with respect to an election to coerce its opposi-
tion to restrict its legitimate electioneering activities. '77 Fairness in the
Rights Plan had a negative impact on a dissident shareholder's proxy campaign. "The Court has
found, as a preliminary factual matter, that the defendants' reduction of the Rights Plan triggering
percentage to 20% did, at least initially, impair [the dissident's] ability to mount an effective
proxy contest. . ." Id. at *39 n.22 Only the board's subsequent decision to amend the Rights Plan
to permit large stockholders to communicate with each other (after the board had reached an
agreement with one of them) defeated the dissidents' efforts to have the change of the Rights Plan
threshold trigger enjoined.
71. For a discussion of why flip-in provisions in Rights Plans are a stronger deterrent than
flip-over provisions, see Lipton and Steinberger, 7 Takeovers and Freezeouts, § 6.03[4][a] at 6-59
(cited in note 23).
72. See notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
73. Apple Bancorp II 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 121.
74. The Apple Bancorp Rights Plan's definition of group was taken from Rule 13d-5 (17 CFR
§ 240.13d-5 (1990)). Apple Bancorp II at *9 n.5. See also Warren and Abrams, 47 Bus. Law. at 663
(cited in note 8). The Rights Plan did not restrict the shareholder's "ability to present a slate and
to communicate with shareholders; nor [did] it impair the shareholders' ability to vote for [his]
slate at the meeting." Apple Bancorp II at *12.
75. Apple Bancorp II at *12.
76. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). Heightened judicial
review of director action designed to impede the franchise required the incumbents to show a
"compelling justification" for these actions. Id. at 661. For further discussion of the equivalence of
the different judicial tests for infringements of the shareholder franchise, see note 88.
77. Apple Bancorp II at *15.
[Vol. 46:503
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vand. L. Rev.  520 1993
DEFENSIVE TACTICS
election process requires a judge, the court wrote, to scrutinize carefully
director actions impinging on shareholder voting rights. Whenever the
stockholder franchise is at issue, "a special obligation falls upon courts
to review with care action that impinges upon legitimate election
activities. '7 8
However, the rest of the court's opinion showed little deference to
the shareholder franchise: it upheld the board's decision to apply the
Rights Plan to Stahl's solicitation efforts, first under Moran, and then
alternatively under Unocal.79 Its Moran analysis was perfunctory. As in
Moran, the plaintiff made arguments about the Rights Plan's negative
effects on his proxy campaign but failed to introduce any empirical evi-
dence supporting his position.80 Based on this slim record, the court
found that the Rights Plan's restrictions on revocable voting agree-
ments between shareholders were "immaterial" to the dissident's
chances of winning the contest.8 1
In the second part of its Moran analysis, the Apple Bancorp court
conducted a highly deferential business judgment type inquiry about
the effects of the Rights Plan on the stockholder franchise.82 It held
that "the Bancorp board could ... have reasonably concluded that the
restrictions here addressed would not materially impair the ability of
the shareholder .to turn out the existing board."' s Under this interpreta-
tion of the second part of Moran, the board of directors does not even
have to show that it considered the impact of the Rights Plan on a
dissident's proxy campaign. Not surprisingly, the board's actions were
upheld.
78. Id.
79. Although the court treated Moran and Unocal as distinct judicial tests, Moran could be
collapsed into a Unocal test. See note 68.
80. Commentators cannot fault the court for the plaintiff's failure to introduce sufficient evi-
dence to support his arguments. Faced with this void, the chancellor relied upon Moran's earlier
determination that the effect of a flip-over Rights Plans upon the dissident's chances of winning a
proxy contest were "minimal." Apple Bancorp II at *18 (cited in note 65). Unfortunately, this
finding ignores flip-in Rights Plans' more serious negative impact on a dissident's chances of win-
ning a joint offer. A better approach would have been for the court to appoint its own expert to
determine the impact of the flip-in Rights Plan upon a dissident's chances of winning the proxy
contest. See notes 241-46 and accompanying text for further discussion of this argument.
81. Apple Bancorp II at *20. While this conclusion has not been tested empirically, the
Court's conclusion is debatable. Restrictions on agreements between shareholders can stop them
from taking collective action in proxy contests on such matters as jointly nominating slates of
directors or reaching agreements about the reimbursement of expenses. See notes 37-38 and ac-
companying text. Most Rights Plans also give the target company's board of directors considerable
discretion in determining which shareholders are part of the group subjected to the Rights Plan's
restrictions. See note 39 and accompanying text.
82. Apple Bancorp II at *18-19.
83. Id. at *21.
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The court then applied the two part Unocal5 4 test, asking whether
the board had shown it had reasonable grounds to believe that a threat
to the corporation existed, and whether its response to the threat was
reasonable. The Apple Bancorp court held that letting the dissident
form revocable voting agreements with other shareholders created a
threat that the corporation would be taken over without shareholders
receiving a premium price for their stock.
The court found, however, that the board's response of using the
Rights Plan to stop Stahl from forming voting agreements with other
shareholders had an adverse effect on Stahl's ability to wage a proxy
campaign. In balancing these two effects to determine the reasonable-
ness of the board's defensive response, the court recognized that the
dissident's joint offer might preclude higher bids from third parties if
the Rights Plan were enjoined. The Rights Plan, the court concluded,
was "justified in the circumstances by the benefit of preserving to some
extent the board's ability to shop the [company]." 5 If no alternative
bid appeared, stockholders were likely to vote to accept the tender
offer.
Apple Bancorp raises serious doubts about the Delaware courts'
commitment to protecting the shareholder franchise from manage-
ment's defensive tactics. Despite its strong rhetoric concerning the need
to protect the franchise, the court's interpretation of Moran's second
prong sharply reduced the scope of that decision's protections. When-
ever a board can "reasonably conclude" that its actions will not "mate-
rially impair" dissidents' ability to win a proxy contest, the court will
uphold its defensive actions. While this interpretation of Moran may
stop incumbents from creating absolute barriers to dissident victories,"6
it would probably permit almost anything else in a control contest.
The court's Unocal analysis, while acknowledging the effect that
incumbents' defensive tactics might have on the outcome of a proxy
contest, still gives the board significant discretion in how it responds to
84. The court claimed that in applying the Unocal test it was following the mandates of the
Delaware Supreme Court's Moran opinion. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350, 1356. The Delaware
courts created the Unocal test to apply in situations in which incumbents take defensive actions
against hostile tender offers. The Unocal test extended no special protections for the shareholder
franchise. It did, however, state that the threat of losing an election contest does not constitute a
legally cognizable threat. Warren and Abrams, 47 Bus. Law. at 663-64 (cited in note 8).
The court applied Unocal (and not Blasius) because it found that "the board's refusal to
amend the rights plan was not for the primary purpose of impeding, and did not affect adversely,
'the fair exercise of the franchise' of the Apple Bancorp stockholders." Id. at 664, (quoting Apple
Bancorp II).
85. Apple Bancorp II at *26.
86. See, for example, Sutton, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *29-39 (striking down a poison pill
type retirement plan that barred dissidents from receiving revocable proxies for more than 35% of
the votes in an election of directors).
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a dissident's challenge. At a minimum, a dissident can take some com-
fort in the fact that the threat of losing an election contest by itself
does not constitute a threat under Unocal. 7 With joint offers, however,
the threat posed by a tender offer to a corporation's long-term business
strategy is likely, after the Paramount decision, to outweigh a Rights
Plan's negative effect on a dissident's election campaign.
c. Summary
While the rhetoric of the various tests applied to Rights Plans dif-
fers, the courts have reached similar results under all of them, " and
they seem increasingly to be using the Unocal framework to analyze
incumbent defensive tactics in proxy contests.89 Under whatever stan-
dard that may be used, several conclusions can be drawn.
When a joint offer is at issue, courts have given incumbents consid-
erable leeway in applying Rights Plans against dissident shareholders'
proxy solicitation campaigns. After Paramount, if the incumbent board
can point to a previously adopted, long-term business plan and argue
that it is superior to the dissident's proposed tender offer, then the
board can shut down the tender offer part of the joint offer.90 Apple
87. Warren and Abrams, 47 Bus. Law. at 663-64 (cited in note 8).
88. For example, the chancellor found that the Blasius "compelling justification" test is
"structurally similar" and "functionally similar" to the Unocal balancing test. Apple Bancorp II at
*22-24; Apple Bancorp I at 1124-25 (cited in note 60); Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 286. As the court
stated in Apple Bancorp II:
Under either test the board bears a burden to justify its actions. The burden will be greater
when the board action is directed specifically and primarily towards the voting process, be-
cause that process is the way in which the board itself derives power and thus is of central
concern to the corporation and to corporation law.
Apple Bancorp II at *23. The choice of the particular form of judicial review between these two
formulations is unlikely to affect the outcome of a case. Id. See Warren and Abrams, 47 Bus. Law.
at 669-70 (cited in note 8). Similiarly, a court's choice to apply Moran instead of Unocal does not
seem to affect the outcome of its analysis. See, for example, Apple Bancorp II at *23.
89. The Delaware Supreme Court recently held that when a board "adopts any defensive
measure taken in response to some threat to corporate policy and effectiveness which touches upon
issues of control," such as board action interfering with the exercise of the franchise in a joint
offer, "a reviewing court must apply Unocal." Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3 (quoting Gilbert v. El
Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1144 (Del. 1990)). To the extent that the competing Blasius test retains a
separate meaning from Unocal, it means that defensive measures that touch upon issues of control
and "purposefully disenfranchise [a target company's] shareholders [are] strongly suspect under
Unocal, and cannot be sustained without a 'compelling justification."' Id. Although the Stroud
court did not expressly consider whether Moran differed from Unocal, the court's language about
the proper scope of the Unocal test leaves little room for a separate Moran analysis.
90. Paramount will have little effect on the courts' treatment of defensive tactics when the
dissidents threaten a change of control solely through the corporate election process: it reaffirms
Moran's statement that the stockholders have the ultimate right to vote the incumbent directors
out of office if they pursue policies that a majority of stockholders disfavor. Paramount Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). See also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663. However, it is also an "authorita-
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Bancorp and Moran allow the target company board to restrict concur-
rently dissident shareholders' ability to wage an effective proxy con-
test."1 As a result, the target company board can force dissidents to rely
completely on the pure proxy contest as a means of- pressuring the in-
cumbent board to negotiate a transaction or to push through a change
of control.
This makes judicial analysis of defensive tactics in pure proxy con-
tests critical. In the Unocal framework, the courts must address two
questions. First, what, if any, threat does a pure proxy contest pose to
the corporation? Second, under the second prong of the Unocal analy-
sis, what responses are reasonable to these threats? Part III examines
the first of these questions, while Part IV addresses the second
question.
III. WHAT ARE THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LETTING MANAGEMENT
EMPLOY RIGHTS PLANS IN PROXY CONTESTS?
A. Management's Interest in Protecting the Corporation and Its
Shareholders
Corporate law rests on the fundamental assumption that share-
holders hire managers to run their companies and to make decisions
about the company's operations and future plans. If they are going to
run these businesses effectively, managers need to have some discretion
to take actions that they believe will maximize the value of the firms.
The shareholders delegate this authority to managers in the belief that
managers will act in the shareholders' best interests to increase the
value of their holdings.9 2
tive reminder" that an action will need to implicate directly the stockholder franchise before the
courts will invoke heightened judicial scrutiny. Warren and Abrams, 47 Bus. Law. at 654 (cited in
note 8). Paramount also permits the board to manipulate the structure of corporate transactions to
deprive their stockholders of the opportunity to vote on fundamental corporate changes. Para-
mount, 571 A.2d at 1146-49.
Nor should Paramount have any effect on a Unocal analysis of proxy contests when control of
the board is not at stake. When the dissident is not attempting to gain control of the corporation,
as might be the case when institutional investors attempt to elect a minority of the directors to a
company's board, then the application of a Rights Plan to their proxy solicitation could have "far
more than a minimal impact" because it could prevent them from engaging in concerted action to
assert their voice in corporate affairs. Gilson and Kraakman, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 904 n.145 (cited in
note 17). Furthermore, the company has no offsetting interest in preventing institutions from act-
ing to elect a minority of the board. Id. Similar arguments can be made that certain state antitake-
over statutes are triggered by the collective actions of groups of institutional investors. Id.
91. See Part II.C.2. for further discussion of the impact of these cases on a dissident's ability
to win a proxy contest.
92. The business judgment rule protects managers' and directors' decisions about the con-
duct of the company's affairs from attack by disgruntled shareholders when the managers and
directors act with due care, in good faith, and loyalty. See, for example, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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When an outside party threatens to bring about an unsolicited
change of control through a tender offer, a well-intentioned manage-
ment may determine that the proposed transaction is not in sharehold-
ers' best interests and rebuff it. A faithful management may have valid
concerns about the proposed transaction. For example, the tender offer
may discriminate against some shareholders and treat them poorly, it
may offer inadequate value to the shareholders for their investment, or
it may preclude shareholders from accepting a more favorable alterna-
tive transaction."' In each of these instances, loyal management will
wish to protect the shareholders and the corporation from harm by us-
ing defensive tactics to stop a harmful acquisition.
The difficult issues arise when management takes defensive actions
to stop its shareholders from accepting an acquisition offer that share-
holders want to accept. While well-intentioned management may have
good reasons to keep their shareholders from hurting themselves,94 the
net effect of the defensive tactics may be to deprive shareholders of
their control over their investment.
When a dissident stockholder couples a hostile acquisition proposal
with the threat of a proxy contest, as in a joint offer, or the threatened
change of control focuses on the election of the board of directors of the
company, management may be tempted to use the same defensive tac-
tics to thwart the attempt to remove them from office using the polls.
Faithful managers honestly believe that resisting their rivals in the elec-
tion is in their shareholders' best interests. When, however, their ac-
tions impair the ability of shareholders to exercise their franchise
effectively, then the courts must critically examine the managers'
actions.
Rights Plans have a direct impact on shareholders' free exercise of
the franchise; yet, as noted above, the courts generally have deferred to
incumbents' decisions to deploy them in proxy contests. Why do the
courts permit incumbents to restrict the shareholder franchise through
the application of Rights Plans against insurgent shareholders' election
campaigns? The answer to this question depends in part on how impor-
tant the franchise is in the market for corporate control and in part on
how strong the justifications are for permitting incumbents to restrict
the franchise. These issues are examined separately below.
93. Gilson and Kraakman, 44 Bus. Law. at 267 (cited in note 51).
94. This may be the case when management promises that it will produce greater value in
the long run for shareholders than the hostile tender offer but shareholders do not believe that
management will deliver on its promise. See id. at 260-65.
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B. The Importance of the Shareholder Franchise in the Market for
Corporate Control
Who controls the corporation is important both to its shareholders
and to society because the value of its assets depends significantly on
the skill with which they are managed. Bad managers will adversely af-
fect the value of the corporation's assets. However, poor managers can-
not be expected to offer generously to give up control over the corporate
assets in order to increase social welfare, even if a better management
team is identified." Rather, they usually will fight to retain their offices
and perquisites with all available methods. From society's perspective,
however, courts should facilitate beneficial control changes despite the
incumbents' opposition. 6
The courts and corporate law theorists have widely recognized the
importance of shareholder voting in bringing about changes in the con-
trol of the corporation.9 7 Free shareholder voting is "critical to the the-
ory that legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and
officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not own" be-
cause it provides the "ideological underpinnings upon which the legiti-
macy of directorial power rests."98 Corporate elections must be
conducted "with scrupulous fairness and without any advantage being
conferred or denied to any candidate or slate of candidates" if society is
to respect the franchise's validity.9  The judiciary accords shareholder
voting rights special protections, especially when "directors, bent upon
entrenchment, use their authority to restrict the ability of shareholders
to replace them."'100
Director action designed to interfere with the franchise alters the
allocation of authority between the shareholders and the board that
governs the corporation. Limiting the shareholders' voting rights to al-
95. One alternative to removing the existing management team is to give them incentives to
perform better by tying their compensation to the firm's performance. Common devices for doing
so include stock option plans and performance bonuses.
96. "From a social perspective, facilitating such changes will have two desirable conse-
quences: the beneficial change itself will increase the value of the company ex post, and the threat
of losing control may well provide ex ante incentives for incumbents to increase the value of the
company." Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1077-78 (cited in note 1). Golden parachutes
may be one method of encouraging managers to agree to the sale of a company at a price that the
company's shareholders want to accept. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial: A Political
and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 542, 563 (1990)
97. "Voting rights of shareholders are a major element in the structure of corporate
law. . . ." Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1073. See, for example, Robert Charles Clark,
Corporate Law 357-400 (Little Brown, 1986) for a general discussion of the importance of voting
rights.
98. Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 659.
99. Id. at 661-62.
100. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1080.
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low the directors to decide what course of action to take presupposes
that the directors know better than the shareholders what is best for
the corporation. Even if courts accept that presupposition, it does not
justify allowing the directors almost absolute control over the election
process-"corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of
the shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters." 101
In protecting shareholder voting rights," 2 the courts have drawn on
the shareholder democracy model of corporate voting. 03 In this model,
courts consider corporations to be democracies governed through
elected representatives. 0 4 The ultimate power over the political leader-
ship and over the corporate directorship lies in the individual share-
holders' hands and is exercised through the shareholder franchise. 0 5
Corporate elections in an ideal shareholder democracy are contests be-
tween rival groups that stand in fairly equal positions with respect to
their chances to put candidates and questions before the electorate. 10 6
101. Blasius Ind., 564 A.2d at 663; see also Durkin v. National Bank of Olyphant, 772 F.2d
55, 59 (3d. Cir. 1985) (interpreting the National Bank Act to hold that "[b]anks do not exist for
the purpose of creating an aristocracy of directors and officers which can continue in office indefi-
nitely, immune from the wishes of the shareholder-owners of the corporation").
102. The federal securities laws proxy solicitation provisions were adopted in part to promote
shareholder democracy. Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets
in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1473, 1491-92 (1987). Congress
and the SEC apparently have adopted the view that shareholders can only exercise their power to
control the corporation if they are well-informed before casting their votes. Id. at 1492.
103. See Mortimer M. Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair
Corporate Suffrage, 39 Va. L. Rev. 141, 150 (1953). Pure shareholder democracy existed, if at all,
only in rare cases when ownership and control were concentrated in the hands of a few people.
Leila N. Sadat-Keeling, The 1983 Amendments To Shareholder Proposal Rule 14A-8: A Retreat
From Corporate Democracy?, 59 Tulane L. Rev. 161, 162 (1984). Even though pure shareholder
democracy is generally impossible, democratic shareholder participation may provide a desirable
counterweight to management's power. For a brief discussion and criticism of this view, see Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis 19 (Little Brown, 1976).
104. The model posits that citizens in a democratic society and corporate stockholders are
similar. Franklin C. Latcham and Frank D. Emerson, Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder
Democracy, 4 Case Western Res. L. Rev. 5 (1952). The board of directors stands accountable to
the shareholders, as in political democracies, through free and open elections.
105. Why should the political democracy model of shareholder participation provide the nec-
essary check on the unrestrained use of managers' power? One answer comes out of political con-
siderations: shareholder democracy, like political democracy, best preserves the political values of
freedom and liberty. Harvey Frank, The Future of Corporate Democracy, 28 Baylor L. Rev. 39,
45-50 (1976).
106. Latcham and Emerson, 4 Case Western Res. L. Rev. at 9 (cited in note 104). Even
shareholder democracy's strongest advocates recognized that in practice the existing system fails to
meet their goals. Shareholder democracy advocates believe that lawmakers need to reform the
system, much the same way that they propose reforms to the political system to correct that sys-
tem's abuses. For example, a more democratic system would result if there were more balanced
reimbursement provisions for campaign expenditures, better procedures for shareholders to nomi-
nate candidates for directorships, greater access to the management proxy statement for share-
holder proposals, and greater dissemination of more information about the corporation and the
candidates for directorships. If lawmakers made these reforms, proponents of this model claim,
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The shareholders can exercise a free choice between these contestants
to select the best group. Proxy contests give shareholders the right to
remove unwanted management: "Obviously, the very essence of such
type of democratic economic organization is the availability to the
shareholders of the untrammeled right of recall, at least on an annual
basis, over those managers whose records are not found to be satisfac-
tory.'10 7 The courts should zealously protect the shareholders' right to
vote, and the right to participate freely in corporate elections, against
the incumbents' attempts to restrict it.
As influential as the shareholder democracy model has been, its
theoretical validity is open to question. 08 The model focuses excessively
on the power of the small shareholder. Modern corporations may have
thousands of small shareholders, widely dispersed in location, but those
thousands generally hold only a small fraction of the company's stock.
The power of larger institutional investors swamps that of the small
stockholder. 09
Courts can more aptly analyze the voting power of institutional
shareholders using the shareholder monitoring model. This model gives
voting an important place among the constraints on managerial miscon-
duct, but discards the political election analogy of the shareholder de-
mocracy model.1 0 In the monitoring model, voting is one of the
they would revive shareholder democracy as shareholders found that they had a meaningful oppor-
tunity to participate in corporate elections. Compare Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Govern-
ance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 1275 (1982).
107. Caplin, 39 Va. L. Rev. at 151 (cited in note 103). The arguments here are similar to
those made by Lowenstein with respect to dual class recapitalizations. Louis Lowenstein, Share-
holder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
979, 1010 (1989). Lowenstein argues that if corporate governance is to approximate the system of
governance utilized in the political realm-namely democracy-then votes should not "be rou-
tinely traded away in private transactions [such as recapitalizations], because of a deep and abid-
ing fear of power without accountability."
108. For example, some critics of this model note that despite all of the rights and powers
held by shareholders, and legal reforms designed to inform shareholders, shareholders continue to
show little interest in running the corporation's affairs or in voting in its elections. Fischel, 35
Vand. L. Rev. at 1274 (cited in note 106). For several other criticisms of the shareholder democ-
racy model, see Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Com-
mon Stock, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119, 141 (1987); William Irvine, Corporate Democracy and the
Rights of Shareholders, 7 J. Bus. Ethics 99, 107 (1988).
109. Professor Conard argues that the "idea was doomed from the start" if its focus rests
solely on the role of individual shareholders, because institutional shareholders already hold the
majority of publicly held equity securities. Alfred Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capi-
talism, 22 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 117, 127-28 (1988).
110. This model postulates that the shareholder-manager relationship is a principal-agent
relationship. The principal needs to monitor the conduct of the agent to insure that the agent
continues to act in the principal's best interests. "Shareholder monitoring is one strand in a web of
imperfect constraints on corporate managers." Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 831 (cited in note 17).
The shareholder monitoring model could be described more accurately as involving discipline
of management rather than just monitoring. As Professor Rock points out, "effective oversight
528
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mechanisms by which the principals of the corporation, the sharehold-
ers, monitor the performance of their agents, the directors and of-
ficers.111 Institutional shareholders are well-placed to act as monitors
because of their greater stake in the company.112
The potential benefits of institutional investor monitoring have
been well-documented.111 Institutional investors could help correct sys-
tematic shortfalls in corporate performance and add value for share-
holders in several ways. These include demanding increased director
independence,114 decreased corporate diversification,1  improved take-
over bidding, 16 better corporate governance rules,117 improved utiliza-
requires more than monitoring management's performance; it requires doing something about
suboptimal performance." Rock, 79 Georgetown L. J. at 453 (cited in note 17).
111. Other monitoring mechanisms include the use of outside directors and independent au-
diting firms to evaluate incumbent managements' performance, institutional shareholders' infor-
mal suggestions, and formal shareholder proposals about corporate governance issues. See, for
example, Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 824; Thomas Andre, A Preliminary Inquiry Into The Util-
ity Of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate Control, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 533, 625 (1990).
112. Of course, the term "institutional investor" masks the significant differences between
the many different types of institutions and their abilities to monitor management effectively. For
an interesting discussion of these differences and their effect on the effectiveness of shareholder
monitoring, see Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 596-604 (cited in note 17).
113. See generally, Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 895 (cited in note 17); Bernard S; Black,
Disclosure, Not Censorship: In Support of Proxy Reform, 17 J. Corp. L. 49 (1991); Jayne W.
Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1135 (1991);
Richard Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57
Brooklyn L. Rev. 1 (1991); Rock, 79 Georgetown L. J. at 445 (cited in note 17); George Dent,
Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 881 (1989);
Coffee, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1277 (cited in note 17).
114. Black claims that the (scanty) available evidence shows that independent directors are
valuable. Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 902. If he is right, then institutional investors can increase
the value of firms by pushing for a majority of independent directors on the board, independent
nominating committees, appointment of institutional directors, and reductions in the CEO's au-
thority to select directors. Id.
115. Corporate diversification strategies consistently have created negative value for ac-
quirers. Institutional investors who already are diversified across companies are ideally placed to
urge companies to stop making conglomerate acquisitions and to divest unrelated divisions or sub-
sidiaries. Id. at 905.
116. In the 1980s many takeover bidders experienced stock price declines from acquisitions.
While these negative returns by themselves do not indicate the transactions were socially undesir-
able, in a large percentage of cases they exceeded target company gains. Id. at 908. Institutional
investors with diversified portfolios have investments in both companies and can be expected to
study these acquisitions closely. They will object when they believe that a transaction will decrease
the value of their portfolio. If institutions can identify factors that will make for negative value
acquisitions, they can push to stop these transactions. Id. at 909-10. The converse should also be
true.
117. Many companies have antitakeover charter and by-law provisions that reduce the fre-
quency of takeover bids and make it more likely that the target will succeed in defeating an offer.
As institutional investors gain more strength, they may be able to remove some of these provisions
and prevent their proliferation. Id. at 911. Similarly, institutions can lobby against state antitake-
over legislation that stops takeovers or push companies to opt out of the statutes. Id. at 911-12.
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tion of free cash flow,"", and changes in the existing system for
calculating executive compensation. 119 Institutional oversight can best
police these corporate failings because "diversified institutions can real-
ize economies of scale in acting to overcome them at a number of port-
folio companies."'' 0 The existing direct evidence on the effects of
institutional shareholder monitoring, while sketchy, suggests that these
changes could raise stock prices significantly. 11'
Shareholder monitoring helps keep "companies from wandering too
far off the profit path.'1 2 2 Shareholders can go to the polls to limit man-
agement's ability to institute antitakeover devices, such as the Rights
Plan.12 3 Outside directors that owe their loyalty to shareholders will act
sooner to remove poor managers. Ultimately, if shareholders believe
that the incumbent management is performing poorly, and the board
fails to replace them, the dissatisfied shareholders can bring a proxy
118. Corporate managers may hoard cash and spend it unwisely. Institutions could discour-
age this overspending in favor of more prudent cash reserves and encourage companies to return
the excess amounts to their shareholders. Id. at 914-15.
119. Institutional investors insisting on the creation of a more arm's length negotiation pro-
cess in the calculation of executive pay could temper recent widespread criticism of executive pay.
Id. at 916-17.
120. Id. at 898.
121. Id. at 895. In addition, research on oversight by large shareholders, although it does not
discriminate between inside ownership and outside ownership, "suggests a generally positive link
between concentrated ownership and corporate performance." Id. at 917. Similarly, evidence from
leveraged buyout transactions in this country and information about the impact of institutional
investors suggest that large shareholder monitoring is valuable. Id. at 925-26. Finally, comparisons
with other countries' corporate governance structures seem to show that financial intermediary
monitoring creates value. Id. at 928. See generally Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate
Governance in Germany, Japan and America, 102 Yale L. J. - (1993) (forthcoming); Ronald J.
Gilson and Mark J. Roe, Understanding The Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate
Governance and Industrial Organization, Stanford Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 97
(August 1992).
122. Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 823 (cited in note 17). Recent successes of institutional
investors in forcing management changes or shake-ups at several major American companies, in-
cluding General Motors, demonstrate dramatically the power of these institutions. See Pound,
Wall St. J. at A10 (cited in note 13).
123. Shareholders can benefit from antitakeover devices if the devices increase managers'
bargaining power with potential acquirers and thereby raise the price that shareholders receive in
a tender offer or if the devices prevent a coercive tender offer. However, management can use these
same devices to insulate themselves from the threat of takeover when their company's performance
is weak. Stock prices, reflecting the net movement of these two effects, show statistically significant
decreases from the introduction of a variety of antitakeover devices. See, for example, Michael
Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 377 (1988);
Paul H. Malatesta and Ralph A. Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitabil-
ity and Ownership Structure, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 347 (1988); Gregg A. Jarrell and Annette B. Poul-
sen, Shark Repellants and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19
J. Fin. Econ. 127 (1987); Gregg A. Jarrell and Annette B. Poulsen, Dual Class Recapitalizations As
Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Recent Evidence, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 129 (1988).
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vand. L. Rev.  530 1993
1993] DEFENSIVE TACTICS
contest to persuade other shareholders to remove the board and ex-
isting management. 2"
Proxy contests (or the threat of them) increase incumbent manage-
ment's responsiveness to its shareholders. 125 Managers are more likely
to hear and to act on investors' demands for meetings and requests for
changes in corporate policies if managers fear the consequences of
alienating investors than if managers are insulated from removal from
office. This is especially true with institutional investors who increas-
ingly have engaged in dialogues with corporate managements about im-
proving corporate performance. 12 Strong management defensive tactics
in proxy contests that tilt the election field even further in manage-
ment's favor will undoubtedly make them less responsive to institu-
tional investors.
A third competing theory of corporate voting, the contractarian
model, 127 emphasizes the importance of voting in fleshing out the de-
tails of the parties' corporate contract. 28 Voting has value primarily be-
cause it facilitates takeovers. 29 When there is no threatened change of
124. Bebchuk and Kahan, Proxy Contests, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1078 (cited in note 1).
125. See, for example, Steven Schulman, The Cost of Free Speech in Proxy Contests for
Corporate Control, 20 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 31-32 (1973).
126. See, for example, Pound, Wall St. J. at A10 (cited in note 13); Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. at 848 (cited in note 17).
127. The contract theory of corporate voting begins with the premise that corporations are a
great web of contracts. Legal rules serve several functions in facilitating the contracting process:
corporate codes act as standard form contracts that can reduce the costs of negotiating contracts
between the parties. See, for example, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, Close Corporations
and Agency Costs, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271, 282 (1986); John Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, The
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev.
919, 932 (1988); Lucian Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1395, 1397 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance:
A Contractual Perspective, 18 J. Corp. L. - (1993) (forthcoming).
128. The leading proponents of this theory argue that "[t]he right to vote is the right to
make all decisions not otherwise provided by contract." Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fis-
chel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & Econ. 395, 402 (1983). Voters elect directors and give
them discretion over many things because voting is expensive and shareholders want to conserve
on its use.
Existing state corporate laws provide investors with different choices of voting arrangements
that they generally would find desirable if they could arrange and enforce contracts at low cost.
Corporate voting forms evolve through competition, with the methods that deliver what the share-
holders want at the lowest cost surviving. See Easterbrook and Fischel, 26 J. L. & Econ. at 416,
418-19 (saying that the most efficient corporate law rules, including voting rules, will survive);
Dennis Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857,
860 (1983); Daniel R. Fischel and Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative
Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261, 274 (1986).
129. Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110
(1965); Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein, The Contracts Clause and the Corporation, 55 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 767, 772 (1989). Easterbrook and Fischel offer several other reasons why voting has value,
including evidence that proxy contests produce price increases for the target's stock even if the
dissidents do not win. Easterbrook and Fischel, 26 J. L. & Econ. at 406-07 (cited in note 128);
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control, either implicitly or explicitly, voting is of little consequence. 130
In a tender offer, an acquirer accumulates shares in a firm, then exer-
cises its voting rights to take control of the firm."' Without voting
rights for shares, tender offers could not succeed. 3 2 Obviously, voting
rights also are central to the success of a proxy contest for corporate
control, for without them shareholders would have no method for elect-
ing a new board.
Each of these three models-the shareholder democracy model, the
monitoring model, and the contractarian model-recognizes the impor-
tance of the free exercise of the shareholder franchise in change-of-con-
trol situations. Why then do the courts continue to approve
management's use of defensive tactics that infringe on shareholder
voting?
C. The Uncertain Case for Permitting Defensive Tactics in Proxy
Contests
1. Argument 1: Inferior Dissidents Win Proxy Contests Because of
Information Imperfections
Bebchuk and Kahan have argued that shareholders have inade-
quate information to determine which contestant is superior in a proxy
contest and, therefore, inferior dissidents may emerge from a proxy
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 67, 70-72
(Harvard, 1991).
Proxy contests play a disciplinary role of policing management's performance. Fischel, 54 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 133-34 (cited in note 108). Corporate officers' lack of tenure gives shareholders the
power to throw out the directors if the agency costs associated with their management of the com-
pany become unacceptable. "The right to vote provides shareholders with the opportunity to de-
cide whether their agents have performed well enough to continue in office." Id. at 133.
130. In uncontested elections, the contract theory claims that shareholders rubberstamp
management's candidates for directorships because economic forces "compel managers to maxi-
mize profits as shareholders would if they controlled the firm." Dent, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. at 885
(cited in note 113). Monitoring of management takes place primarily through these institutional
constraints, and only weakly through shareholder voting. Fischel, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 133 (cited
in note 108). Others have disputed this view of the economic constraints on managers. See, for
example, Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 811 (cited in note 17); Dent, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. at 886-92. Of
course, the threat of a change of control can be implicit, in which case voting can persuade manag-
ers to change their policies even when dissidents have made no express threat of a proxy contest.
131. Easterbrook and Fischel, 26 J. L. & Econ. at 402-03 (cited in note 128). Corporate ac-
quirers will accumulate shares in a poorly managed firm and exercise their voting rights to take
control of the corporation. Id. at 402-03. See also Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Struc-
ture of Corporate Law at 67 (cited in note 129).
132. The success of a tender offer depends heavily on voting rights. "For a tender offer to
succeed and be a socially useful mechanism, several conditions must be satisfied: (1) there must be
voting rights; (2) they must be susceptible to being bought and sold (along with the shares that
have them, usually); and (3) their purchaser must be able to obtain a reward for having expended
funds to obtain control." Clark, Corporate Law at 398 (cited in note 97).
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contest as winners.13 Their argument rests on two premises: first, that
the shareholder profile of companies involved in proxy contests is com-
prised largely of shareholders whose wealth will not be affected greatly
by the outcome of the contest; and second, that "these shareholders will
consider it unlikely that their few votes will affect the outcome of the
control contest. 13 4 Shareholders will therefore lack incentives to be-
come informed and fail to select rationally the best candidates.
3 5
Looking first at the modern corporation's shareholder profile, the
empirical evidence shows that large shareholders control most of the
major publicly traded companies' stock and that these shareholders'
ownership percentage has increased rapidly over the last decade. By
1990, institutions held more than fifty-three percent of the total pub-
licly held equities in the United States, with pension funds alone con-
trolling more than twenty-eight percent of equity securities. 3 6
Individual shareholders' percentage holdings have fallen sharply over
the same time period.
This data make the importance of the institution's vote in proxy
contests obvious. 3 7 Adding the institution's holdings to those of other
large blockholders, and the participants in the contest, these stockhold-
ers may own as much as ninety percent or more of a target company's
stock.138 Although each of these shareholders may control only a small
133. See Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1080-81 (cited in note 1).
134. Id. at 1080.
135. Id. at 1080-81.
136. Black, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 827 (cited in note 17). This marks a 15.3% increase in
institutions' share of total U.S. market capitalization in the period from 1981 to 1990. See also
Rock, 79 Georgetown L. J. at 447 (cited in note 17).
137. Pound's data for 1981-1985 show that for his entire sample of 100 contests, institutional
stock ownership averaged approximately 20%. Pound, 29 J. Fin. Econ. at 252 (cited in note 2).
Borstadt and Zwirlein find that institutional investors held on average over 18% of the target
companies' shares in a sample of 142 proxy contests for the period from 1962-1986. Lisa F. Bor-
stadt and Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An Empirical
Analysis of Post Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance, Working Paper at 9 (Sept.
1990). More recent data show a large increase in institutional shareholdings in target companies. In
a study of 343 proposed antitakeover amendments using data from 1985-1988, the average institu-
tional ownership of the sample companies was over 40%. Philip J. Young, James A. Millar, and G.
William Glezen, Shareholder Voting: The Impact of Ex-Voting Date Trading Volume, Meeting
Date Lag, and Management Solicitation Efforts at 22, Table 3. Thomas and Martin find that for
89 proxy contests from 1985-1991, the average level of institutional shareholdings in target compa-
nies was 37.9%. Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, The Impact of Poison Pills on Proxy
Contests: An Empirical Analysis, Working Paper, at 29, Table 2 (1992) (on file with author).
138. Besides the institutions, other large groups control significant percentages of the target
companies' stock. For instance, Pound's study shows that 5% blockholders on average hold an-
other 10% of the companies' stock, while management and dissidents collectively hold another
20% on average. Pound, 29 J. Fin. Econ. at 252 (cited in note 2). When foreign shareholders, who
frequently own another 6%-10% of many companies' stock, and who generally do not vote in
proxy contests, are eliminated, the percentage stock holdings of other investors in most target
companies can be quite small.
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percentage of the target company's stock,13 9 the dollar amount of their
investments are frequently many millions of dollars. In these circum-
stances, rational shareholders will become informed and vote in what
they perceive to be a wealth-maximizing fashion.
140
Large shareholders will have greater incentives to become informed
in a proxy contest. A shareholder with 1000 shares is 1000 times more
likely to cast the decisive vote than one with one share, and will capture
1000 times the gain if its vote is decisive."" If the gains realized by an
institutional shareholder are multiplied by the probability its vote will
be decisive in the contest, the result shows how an institution's incen-
tives to make an informed vote increase exponentially with the number
of shares it owns.
The current popularity of joint offers, and the larger size of the
targets of proxy contests,142 also increase the likelihood that target com-
pany shareholders will carefully consider their votes. When the compa-
nies are publicly traded, individual institutions typically own shares in
both the target and the bidder. In deciding how to cast their votes, they
weigh the net impact of the proposed transaction on the value of their
portfolio. 4 3 Even if the price offered for the target companies' stock
139. As Professor Black points out, a number of legal obstacles make it hard for any share-
holder to accumulate a large percentage of a company's stock. Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 822-24
(cited in note 17).
140. "Institutions are more likely than other shareholders to vote at all, more likely to vote
against manager proposals, and more likely to vote for proposals by other shareholders." Id. at 926.
See also John Pound, Shareholder Activism and Share Values: The Causes and Consequences of
Countersolicitations Against Management Antitakeover Proposals, 32 J. L. & Econ. 357, 358
(1989).
Bebchuk and Kahan appear to concede that the rise in institutional shareholdings has reduced
the severity of the information problem. See Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1082 (cited in
note 1). Their analysis, however, stops short of the arguments made here.
141. Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 822 (cited in note 17).
142. In 1991, the largest transaction in the mergers and acquisition field was AT&T's suc-
cessful $6 billion joint tender offer for NCR and proxy contest that led to a negotiated merger of
the two companies. More generally, Georgeson's 1990 Proxy Contest Study shows significant in-
creases in the percentage of proxy contests involving companies with assets of over $250 million. In
1986, 25% of target companies had assets valued at more than $250 million. This percentage rose
to 43% in 1987, 61% in 1988, 56% in 1989, and 61% for the first nine months of 1990. Georgeson
& Co., Proxy Contest Study, at 22, 24, Fig. 10 and 13 (cited in note 4). While analysts can attri-
bute part of this trend toward bigger targets to the impact of inflation on asset values, it seems
clear that proxy contest targets are getting bigger.
143. Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 909-10 (cited in note 17). For example, in the NCR and
AT&T proxy contest many institutions held stock in both companies. The Institutional Share-
holder Services, Inc. Proxy Analysis projected that AT&T's joint offer would have the effect of
raising NCR's stock price but reducing AT&T's stock price. Institutional Shareholder Services,
NCR Corp. Proxy Analysis, Vol VI, No.33 (March 11, 1991). It recommended to its clients, many
of the major institutions in the country, that
... if the market value of your AT&T shares as of March 1, 1991 (the record date for the
NCR meeting) was at least five times as much as the market value of your NCR holdings on
534
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exceeds its current market price, any decline in the bidder's stock will
offset this gain. If the net effect of the transaction decreases the value
of the institutions' portfolios, they will register their disapproval of the
offer through direct methods (voting against the dissident slate) 44 and
indirect methods (pressuring the bidder to drop the offer).4
The trend toward larger targets of proxy contests will further in-
crease the likelihood of better informed shareholder voting. For one
thing, larger companies tend to have a higher percentage of their stock
held by institutions, especially if they participate in one of the widely
publicized stock market indices. 14 Legal rules lead these shareholders
to consider carefully the merits of the contestants' positions. The insti-
tutional shareholders have fiduciary duties to vote in their beneficiaries'
best interests in a proxy contest.147 They must scrutinize the positions
of the opposing camps to fulfill these duties. Many institutions have
developed special committees or groups that decide which group to vote
for. Other institutions rely on outside specialists for recommendations
about which side they should support in ongoing proxy battles. 48
the same date, we think that your net returns will be negative, and recommend that you vote
against the AT&T slate. Otherwise, we recommend that you vote in favor.
Id. at 9.
For a discussion of the effects of investor diversification on corporate control transactions, see
generally Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.
J. 698, 711-14 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in
Tender Offers, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1982).
144. In circumstances in which they hope that the dissidents will obtain only minority repre-
sentation, some institutions have split their votes between dissidents and incumbents. Black, 39
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 846.
145. The AT&T-NCR contest is a good example of how institutions holding stock in both the
target and the bidder can try to stop the deal. Some institutions voted against the AT&T slate of
candidates because they thought the transaction would have the net effect of reducing AT&T's
value by more than the increased value of NCR. Id. at 910. Other institutions looked only at the
NCR takeover premium and voted in favor of the takeover. Id.
146. Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 856. Many institutions hold portfolios that consist of all of
the stocks in one of the well-known market indices, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Index or the
Standard and Poor's 500. James A. White, Pension Funds Think Less May Be More, Wall St. J.
C1 (Oct. 23, 1991). This strategy of buying a basket of stocks whose performance mirrors that of
the market permits the institutions to keep pace with the market while insuring that their transac-
tion costs remain low.
147. Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 856-57. For an in-depth treatment of the legal issues that
arise out of proxy voting by institutional shareholders, see generally Dan M. McGill, ed., Proxy
Voting of Pension Plan Equity Securities (Irwin, 1989).
148. For example, many institutions, such as Wells Fargo, a large index fund manager, rely
on proxy contest analyses published by the Proxy Advisory Service of Institutional Shareholder
Services, Inc. for recommendations on how they should vote in proxy contests. Black, 39 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. at 855. These proxy analyses contain historical information about the target company,
details of interviews of both dissident groups and incumbent management, and Institutional
Shareholder Service's analyses of the two sides' positions. See, for example, 7 Jefferson-Pilot
Proxy Analysis 8-22 (April 17, 1992). See also Victor F. Zonana, Activist Shareholders Spur
Growth Of A New Kind Of Advice Industry, L.A. Times D3 (July 21, 1991).
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Information about these large target companies is generally easily
accessible. Larger target companies receive greater media coverage of
their proxy contests because the press considers them more news-
worthy. More valuable corporate assets also could justify greater ex-
penditures by the dissidents to inform the shareholders, and the public,
of their position.149
Finally, the costs of obtaining good information about proxy con-
tests are comparatively low. Proxy contests are relatively rare, averag-
ing about twenty-eight a year over the past ten years. The number of
contests any institutional shareholder is likely to be involved in is likely
to be low.150
Information about the relative merits of both parties' positions is
readily available. Both contestants have every incentive to develop their
most convincing arguments, and to expose the weaknesses of the other
side's position. In a close election, shareholders can expect contestants
to contact them several times and to provide extensive information
about both sides' business plans, credentials, and past accomplish-
ments. To the extent that the contestants' materials are defective, the
media and third-party services offer their own analyses. 151
Nevertheless, any shareholder that does not own all of the com-
pany's shares may have "inadequate information incentives."'1 2 If some
shareholders are not well-informed about the merits of the two sides in
a proxy contest, sound public policy points toward encouraging them to
become better informed. The courts should carefully scrutinize any bar-
rier to better dissemination of information. 153
149. Management faces almost no constraints on the amount that it can spend in defending
against a proxy contest because the corporation invariably will reimburse its expense. Dissidents
will have greater incentives to spend more on the contest when they believe that they will realize
greater gains from a victory. Everything else being equal, this is more likely to be true if the value
of the target company's assets is high than if the target's assets are worth little.
150. Georgeson & Company, Inc., Proxy Contest Study, at 22, Table 10 (cited in note 4).
151. See note 148 for further discussion.
152. Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1080 n.30 (cithd in note 1).
153. Bebchuk and Kahan express a related concern: that proxy contestants will be subject to
imperfect incentives to enter contests. Id. at 1081. Under existing laws, a dissident group faces a
significant risk of losing the contest and bearing all of the costs of its campaign. If it wins, how-
ever, the group gets only its pro rata share of the gains from its improved management team with
other shareholders receiving the remainder of these benefits. Balancing these costs and benefits
will deter rational dissidents from entering some contests when society would benefit from their
intervention. Bebchuk and Kahan propose revising the proxy contest expense reimbursement rules
to eliminate this disincentive. Id. at 1106-26.
The presence or absence of defensive tactics influences the entry decision. Lax legal rules
regulating defensive tactics will reduce dissidents' chances of winning proxy contests and lower the
likelihood of their commencing a proxy contest. Id. at 1104 n.122. Although a thorough investiga-
tion of dissidents' decisions to enter a proxy contest is beyond the scope of this paper, a researcher
could apply Bebchuk and Kahan's framework for analyzing entry decisions to examine the interac-
tion of the entry decision and defensive tactics.
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Rights Plans (and other defensive tactics) can obstruct the flow of
information between dissident groups and other shareholders."
Nonaligned shareholders may avoid contacting dissident groups about
pending proxy contests for fear of becoming involved in litigation con-
cerning the reach of a Rights Plan.15s Furthermore, the broad scope of
beneficial ownership in Rights Plans, and the possibility of inadver-
tently triggering the plan through group activity, will make other share-
holders think twice before contacting a dissident group to ask for more
information about their plans.
In sum, commentators have greatly overstated the importance of
the "inadequate information" problem in recent proxy contests.
Changes in the shareholder profile of most companies and the increased
use of joint offers have led to a more informed shareholder electorate.
To the extent that information problems persist, permitting incum-
bents to use Rights Plans against dissident groups may exacerbate
these problems.
2. Argument 2: Self-Enriching Small Shareholders Win Proxy
Contests
A second argument made in favor of management defensive actions
in proxy contests is that dissident groups may be comprised of small
shareholders who lack the proper incentives to maximize total share-
holder wealth. 56 Victorious small shareholders may put inferior, dis-
honest managers into office if these shareholders stand to gain more
from siphoning off side payments and perquisites from the target com-
pany than they would lose from the resulting diminution of their
stock's value. 57 Large shareholders that have a greater portion of their
154. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text for further discussion of Rights Plans' impact
on the dissemination of information about proxy contests. The courts also could view Rights Plans
as calculated efforts by managers to provide disinformation because they pretend to give "rights"
to shareholders when in fact they have the opposite effect.
155. For further discussion of how this problem impacts on proxy contests, see notes 42-47
and accompanying text (analyzing the proxy contest between Avon and Chartwell).
156. Easterbrook and Fischel, 26 J. L. & Econ. at 413 (cited in note 128). There is one impor-
tant caveat to this argument: it is limited to cases in which the incumbents control more of the
target company's stock than the dissident group. Only in this situation will the incentives for the
incumbents to maximize the total value of the company exceed those of the dissidents. In fact,
available statistical data show that, for those companies that experience proxy contests, average
dissident stockholdings are more than twice as large as those of incumbent managers. Thomas and
Martin, Working Paper at 29, Table 2 (cited in note 137).
157. Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 77 (cited in note
129). Easterbrook and Fischel claim that the market normally will insure that these contestants
will be defeated because those who believe the stock is overpriced, and who might agree with the
dissidents that the company is mismanaged, will sell their shares. The remaining stockholders will
have relatively homogeneous (positive) expectations about the firm's performance, making it diffi-
cult to persuade them to vote for a change. Easterbrook and Fischel, 26 J. L. & Econ. at 414-15.
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wealth tied up in the company are more likely to work to improve man-
agement and to make needed investments because they stand to cap-
ture a larger portion of the resultant gains. 158
While victories by self-dealing small shareholders are possible, they
are unlikely. For a dissident group to have a realistic chance of winning
a proxy contest, it must either control a very sizeable block of the com-
pany's stock,159 or convince other shareholders that it is preferable to
existing management. If the dissidents hold a large enough block of the
company's stock to win the contest with little help from other share-
holders, their incentives to maximize their personal wealth should be
closely aligned with maximizing the company's share price. In all other
cases, dissidents will need to convince the other shareholders that their
business plan is solid, that they are not going to loot the company, and
that incumbent management is incompetent.
Even when a dissident succeeds in getting its message out to the
other shareholders, the incumbent enjoys an advantage in a close con-
test. If the relative merits of the two sides' positions appear equal,
many shareholders vote for management. 60 A combination of apathy,
and the seemingly smaller downside risks of voting for management,
"the devil they know," may explain many shareholders' tendency to
vote for the incumbents. The incumbents' many advantages in proxy
contests may explain the rest: incumbents set the date for the share-
holder meeting and the record date for determining which shareholders
are entitled to vote at the meeting, they have preferred access to the
stockholder lists, they receive unlimited reimbursement of their solici-
tation expenses, they have established goodwill among their sharehold-
ers through their previous contacts or other business connections with
shareholders, and they have control over the nomination process and
the agenda for the meeting.' When a dissident group appears likely to
158. Id. at 415. Large shareholders capture a greater percentage of the gain from improving
the firm's performance because they have a larger equity stake. This increases the likelihood that
they will bring a proxy contest to remove poor managers and improve corporate performance, and
not to capture side payments and perquisites.
159. Pound's study of 100 proxy contests (including issue contests) during the period of
1981-1985 found that dissidents' average stockholdings were about 12% of the total equity of the
target company. Pound, 20 J. Fin. Econ. at 252 (cited in note 2). Thomas and Martin's more recent
study of proxy contests found that average dissident stock ownership was 11.4%. Thomas and
Martin, Working Paper at 29, Table 2 (cited in note 137).
160. Small shareholders overwhelmingly favor incumbents in most proxy contests. Gilson
and Black, Finance of Corporate Acquisitions at 453 (cited in note 14). Institutional shareholders
also generally vote for the incumbents, Pound, 32 J. L. & Econ. at 371 (cited in note 140), although
more recent data suggest that this effect is less significant today, Thomas and Martin, Working
Paper at 25.
161. Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1084-85 (cited in note 1); Pound, 32 J. L. &
Econ. at 362-63. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation at 97-127 (cited in
[Vol. 46:503
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win, incumbents can often stave off defeat at the last minute by em-
bracing the dissident platform as their own.16 2
To win, dissidents must convince the more sophisticated, larger in-
vestors, usually the institutional investors, that they will be better off
with the dissidents in control of the company. These investors are likely
to scrutinize carefully the composition of the dissident group and the
merits of its proposals. "' High quality management teams should have
little to fear from dissident proxy solicitations.'6" Even if shareholders
believe that the dissident management team will be superior, many in-
stitutional investors are subject to various pressures to vote for the in-
cumbent management. 6 5 If a dissident group of small shareholders can
win the contest in the face of these obstacles, society seems to have
little need for permitting incumbent management to use defensive tac-
tics, such as Rights Plans, to "protect" the other shareholders.
3. Argument 3: Proxy Contests Decrease Social Wealth
Many commentators have dismissed proxy contests as ineffective
and inefficient disciplinary mechanisms."6 6 If existing empirical studies
showed that proxy contests are inefficient, that is, they decrease social
wealth, they would provide an efficiency-based justification for allowing
incumbents to impede dissidents' efforts to win proxy contests.'6 7 The
available empirical studies do not measure the social wealth effects of
note 103). Some other advantages include the following: Shareholders are reluctant to vote for the
"devil they don't know," especially small, less-diversified shareholders, and management controls
the reporting of net profits and frequently dresses them up to look better. Linda E. DeAngelo,
Managerial Competition, Information Costs, And Corporate Governance: The Use of Accounting
Performance Measures in Proxy Contests, 10 J. Acct. & Econ. 3 (1988).
162. For an outstanding example of this strategy, see Edmund A. Stephan, Highlights of the
Montgomery Ward Proxy Contest from a Lawyer's Viewpoint, 11 Bus. Law. 86 (1955).
163. Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1101 (cited in note 1) (stating that
"[sihareholder support for a contestant, and thus the degree to which disinterested shareholders
would be inclined to vote for challengers rather than incumbents, depends primarily on share-
holder perceptions of the relative quality of management")
164. Poor management that shows marked improvement will reduce their risk of ouster as
shareholders learn of the improvement and stock prices rise, thereby reducing dissidents' opportu-
nity to earn gains from improving management and lessening their incentives to launch a proxy
contest. Id. at 1102.
165. See Black, 89 Mich. L. Rev. at 595-608 (cited in note 17), for an insightful review of the
conflicts of interest faced by different institutions. See also Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at
1084 n.55.
166. Proxy contests are "the most expensive, the most uncertain, and the least used" of the
different methods of changing control of a corporation. Manne, 73 J. Pol. Econ. at 114 (cited in
note 129). See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1171 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
Stan. L. Rev. 819, 843 (1981).
167. Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1088.
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proxy contests, unfortunately, only proxy contests' effect on private
costs and benefits. Nevertheless, if these studies showed that proxy con-
tests have an unequivocally negative impact on shareholder wealth,
they would strongly support using defensive tactics in proxy contests.
Existing studies focus on testing the hypothesis that proxy contests
operate as a disciplinary force that keeps management's interests al-
igned with those of shareholders.16 This theory postulates that proxy
contests will either replace poor managers with better ones, or give poor
managers a loud wake-up call to improve their performance.'6 9 The dis-
ciplinary hypothesis predicts that proxy contests will lead to increases
in the target company's stock price and improved operating perform-
ance by proxy contest targets. Target companies also should exhibit
poor operating performance prior to the contest. 7 0 Existing empirical
work largely confirms these predictions.
Target companies exhibit share price increases after the announce-
ment of proxy contests, suggesting that proxy contests benefit share-
holders by transferring corporate resources to more highly valued
uses.17 ' Dodd and Warner find that these stock price increases occur
168. Early theoretical papers on these questions argued that proxy contests could not be
effective monitoring mechanisms because incumbents had control of the proxy machinery, giving
them a major advantage, and because successful dissidents would only capture a small portion of
the gains from winning the contest. See Manne, 73 J. Pol. Econ. at 114-15 (cited in note 129). See
also Pound, 20 J. Fin. Econ. at 237 (cited in note 2) (arguing that proxy contests are relatively
ineffective as a disciplinary device). Compare Dodd and Warner's description of proxy contests as
a disciplinary mechanism "somewhere between a board dismissal of management and an outside
takeover by another corporation." Peter Dodd and Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A
Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 401, 405 (1983).
169. In the case in which dissidents gain control of the company and cause a change of man-
agement the implication is clear. When dissidents fail to gain board seats, incumbent manage-
ment's exposure to a threat of loss of employment, and the potential future threat from unhappy
shareholders, suggests that managerial performance in those companies should improve as well.
170. Manne, 73 J. Pol. Econ. at 14 (cited in note 129). The evidence about target companies'
performance prior to the initiation of a proxy contest is mixed. Duvall and Austin found that on
average targets of proxy contests had lower rates of return on equity than did their respective
industries. Richard M. Duvall and Douglas V. Austin, Predicting the Results of Proxy Contests, 20
J. of Fin. 464, 464-67 (1965) (examining 64 proxy contests for control in the 1956-1960 period).
In examining long-term stock returns prior to the contest, neither Dodd and Warner nor De-
Angelo observed significant evidence of abnormal returns. Dodd and Warner, 11 J. Fin. Econ. at
406 (cited in note 168) and DeAngelo, 10 J. Acct. & Econ. at 4 (cited in note 161). DeAngelo did
find that the accounting rate of return on equity for contest targets underperformed a benchmark
based on the median return for a broad sample of companies for a period of three years prior to
the contest. Id.
171. Dodd and Warner, 11 J. Fin. Econ. at 401 (analyzing a sample of 96 proxy contests for
board seats from 1962 to 1978 and finding an average abnormal stock price gain of nine percent
from 60 trading days before contest announcement through the day after the outcome is an-
nounced); Harry DeAngelo and Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly
Held Corporations, 23 J. Fin. Econ. 29 (1989) (finding similar results for a more recent sample of
companies); J. Harold Mulherin and Annette B. Poulsen, Does a Proxy Have Real Moxie? The
Performance Effects of Proxy Contests in the 1980s, Clemson University and University of Geor-
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even when the dissident is unsuccessful in obtaining representation on
the board. 17 2 DeAngelo and DeAngelo extend Dodd and Warner's analy-
sis by showing that a substantial portion of the stock price gains from a
proxy contest arise from the increased probability of the target being
subsequently taken over. 71 s If dissidents win, frequently they will ac-
quire the entire firm. Yet, in two-thirds of the contests, a win by the
incumbents leads to a sale of the company, a liquidation, or a change of
management within three years of the contest.
Proxy contests also generally lead to improvements in operating
performance. 17 4 Mulherin and Poulsen find significant stock price in-
creases at the announcement of proxy contests and improvements in
performance measured through changes in operating income, although
the latter are generally insignificant. 175 Borstadt and Zwirlein show that
the observed gains in stock price are not dissipated over the three years
following the contest. e76
In contests in which the dissidents gain a majority of the board,
however, researchers have observed declines in operating performance
over a period of several years. 77 Those firms that undergo dissident vic-
gia Working Paper 4-5 (August 1991) (confirming findings of significant shareholder wealth in-
creases at proxy contest announcements). See also Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure
of Corporate Law at 71 (cited in note 129).
However, as Bebchuk and Kahan note, whether the stock price increases observed in a proxy
contest result from management making a real performance improvement, or from management
manipulating shareholder perceptions of performance by various subterfuges, is unclear ex ante.
Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1102-03 (cited in note 1). The former will increase social
wealth, while the latter may be socially costly.
172. Dodd and Warner, 11 J. Fin. Econ. at 401 (cited in note 168) (finding that average
abnormal stock price gains from 60 trading days before contest announcement through the day
after the outcome is announced show average gains of 13% when the dissidents gain control and
8% when the incumbents retain control). However, they do not explain where this value increase
comes from or why stock prices increase even when the incumbents win.
173. See DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 23 J. Fin. Econ. at 29 (cited in note 171).
174. Mulherin and Poulsen, Working Paper at 4-5 (cited in note 171).
175. Id. They claim that if proxy contests are an integral part of the market for corporate
control, then society must judge the contests' success by whether they lead to improvements in
shareholder wealth and corporate operating performance. See also David Ikenberry and Josef
Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through The Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, Rice
University Working Paper No. 86 at 4 (1991) (finding improvements in operating performance
measures when management nominees retain all board seats).
176. Borstadt and Zwirlein, Working Paper at 13 (cited in note 137). They find that proxy
contests are a step "along the path to a change in control of the corporation even when the dissi-
dents are unsuccessful in their attempt to obtain board representation during the challenge." Id.
Proxy contests serve to alert the takeover market about potentially mismanaged firms, and then
the market determines whether circumstances warrant a change of control. Dissident activity thus
serves a disciplinary function, leading to permanent gains for shareholders. Id. at 20.
177. Id. at 17-20; Ikenberry and Lakonishok, Rice University Working Paper No. 86 at 4
(cited in note 175). Ikenberry and Lakonishok point out that an earnings decline during the first
year after a dissident victory might be explained by the "earnings bath" effect reported by De-
Angelo. Id. at 4. This phenomenon reflects dissidents' attempts to blame previous management for
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tories followed by a change of management (but not a sale to another
firm) experience significant negative abnormal returns in the post-con-
test period.178 Notably, these companies account for only a small per-
centage of the proxy contests included in these studies.
One possible interpretation of these results is that not all control
changes through the proxy contest mechanism are in the shareholders'
best interests. Observers could interpret this downward drift in returns
for dissident victories, and negative abnormal returns for companies
when dissidents win seats on their board, as evidence that proxy con-
tests are value destroying transactions. An alternative explanation is
more consistent with the existing evidence. "Dissidents are more likely
to win control of firms that are in very bad operating shape.... [I]f the
dissidents who take control of poor firms are unable to subsequently
affect a sale of the firm, there is little hope of salvaging an already sink-
ing ship. '179 Ikenberry and Lakonishok's finding that companies in
which dissidents won seats suffered from more severe performance
problems on average than other companies supports this explanation.5 °
Nevertheless, these findings suggest that for firms in very bad shape,
replacing existing management through a proxy contest may hasten
their demise.
By comparison with proxy contests, the benefits that joint offers
provide to target company shareholders are larger and unequivocally
positive. 81 Studies of the benefits of tender offers indicate the general
size of benefits created by joint offers. 182 Studies of target shareholder
poor decisions and then having the company take earnings hits in the period after the dissidents
take power. It may also reflect security analysts' overly optimistic projections for companies taken
over by dissidents. See Daniel W. Collins and Linda DeAngelo, Accounting Information and Cor-
porate Governance: Market and Analyst Reactions to Earnings of Firms Engaged in Proxy Con-
tests, 13 J. Acct. & Econ. 213, 230-32 (1990).
178. Borstadt and Zwerlein, Working Paper at 17-20 (cited in note 137). See also Ikenberry
and Lakonishok, Rice University Working Paper No. 86 (cited in note 175) (finding negative oper-
ating performance and abnormal stock price returns when dissidents won seats on a board, but
finding this result to be less negative and insignificant when a change of management occurred
within 24 months of the proxy contest).
This conforms with the observed performance of acquiring firms after takeovers: they tend to
exhibit downward drifts in stock prices. Borstadt and Zwerlein, Working Paper, at 27-28. See also
Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597, 609 n.40 (1989) (sum-
marizing several studies on this issue).
179. Borstadt and Zwirlein, Working Paper at 19.
180. Id. at 17-19. Ikenberry and Lakonishok analyze data for five years prior to the initiation
of dissident activity. They find that target companies exhibit significant negative abnormal returns
prior to the announcement of the proxy contest. Id. at 3-4.
181. In recent years, legal scholars and finance theorists have extensively studied tender of-
fers' benefit. A thorough review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. See Black, 41
Stan. L. Rev. at 601-13 (cited in note 178), for a thoughtful discussion of these studies.
182. See Gilson and Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions at 458 (cited in
note 14). One potential difference between the two species of tender offers stems from the lengthy
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gains in tender offers uniformly show that bidders paid large premiums
over existing market prices during the 1980s, on average fifty percent
over existing prices.18 These premiums substantially enriched target
company shareholders.184 Apparently, losses by the shareholders of ac-
quiring companies from successful tender offers did not offset these
gains to target company shareholders: the estimated returns to acquir-
ing company shareholders in the 1980s range from slightly negative to
insignificantly different from zero. 8" While not conclusively establish-
ing that joint tender offer and proxy contests create wealth for society,
these studies offer support for that position. I86
Proxy contests have significant transactions costs that represent
real social costs. An incumbent management's fight to win a proxy con-
test diverts time and attention away from operating the business. The
fight may lower the morale of existing personnel and may increase em-
time period required to complete a proxy contest. Id. at 458-459. This delay gives the target ample
time to conduct a search for an alternative bidder. This search may affect the distribution of gains
between the bidder and target. It may also increase the likelihood of an auction, an outcome that
will affect the bids that the target receives. Id. at 458-59. Bidders who expect no operating syner-
gies with the target would anticipate that the targets value to them will parallel that expected by
other bidders. The increased possibility of an auction will discourage this type of bidder. Synergis-
tic bidders, who expect some unique form of synergistic gain from operating the target, will still
believe that they can recognize greater value from the target company than other bidders and
having to participate in an auction should upset them less. Id. As a rough approximation though,
the benefits and costs realized from a joint tender offer and proxy contest should correspond to
those generated by an ordinary tender offer.
183. See Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley and Jeffry M. Netter, The Market For Corpo-
rate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 49 (Winter 1988); Black, 41
Stan. L. Rev. at 601-05 (cited in note 178).
184. Jensen calculates that target shareholders realized roughly $346 billion in overall gains
from takeovers and restructurings in the ten-year period 1977-86, while Black and Grundfest esti-
mate that the gains to target shareholders from takeovers between 1981 and 1986 were $162 bil-
lion. Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 21 (Winter
1988); Bernard S. Black and Joseph Grundfest, Shareholder Gains From Takeovers and Restruc-
turings Between 1981 and 1986: $162 Billion Is A Lot Of Money, 1 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 5 (Spring
1988).
185. Black, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 602 (cited in note 178); Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 2 J.
Econ. Persp. at 53 (cited in note 183).
186. Scholars heavily debate the source of these gains. One group of scholars believes that
the premiums paid in takeovers reflect real efficiency gains from productive entrepreneurial activi-
ties that improve the control and management of assets and help to move assets to more produc-
tive uses. Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 2 J. Econ. Persp. at 6-8 (cited in note 183). Other
economists studying accounting data reject this claim because these data fail to show significant
improvements in the targets performance. Black, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 605-06 (cited in note 178).
These studies suggest that the gains to target shareholders simply may represent wealth transfers
from others, such as the target's creditors or employees. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulat-
ing the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corpo-
rate Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145 (1984). Compare Black, 41 Stan. L. Rev. at 611-12
(summarizing empirical studies that show that wealth transfers explain at most a small fraction of
these transfers). An intermediate thesis posits that some of these gains represent efficiency gains,
but that in many cases target shareholders gain because bidders overpay for the target. Id. at 601.
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ployee turnover. The contestants can incur substantial costs in bringing
and defending a proxy contest.18 7 Furthermore, proxy contest defensive
tactics may be costly to implement and wasteful in themselves. 188 When
insiders dominate a target company's board, Rights Plans are particu-
larly costly to that company's shareholders.8 9 The corporation, and ul-
timately its shareholders, bear these costs.
In short, while the existing empirical data strongly suggest that
proxy contests increase wealth (except in a small percentage of cases),
no research has compared all of the relevant costs and benefits. Proxy
contests lead to increases in stock prices and improved operating per-
formance for most target companies. Wealth increases are especially
pronounced with joint offers. However, for very poorly performing com-
panies, operating performance deteriorates if dissidents win control of
the board and fail to sell or to restructure the company. In addition,
conducting a proxy contest entails significant costs. For these reasons,
the most that can be said is that the use of defensive tactics, such as
Rights Plans, in proxy contests cannot be justified as wealth increasing
based on our current state of knowledge.
4. Argument 4: Joint Offers Pose the Same Threats as Tender
Offers
The fourth argument in favor of managerial defensive tactics in
proxy contests focuses on a special subset of proxy contests: joint offers.
As incumbent management has obtained the weapons to defeat naked
tender offers, joint offers have become increasingly important to the
market for corporate control.' 90 In responding to this new threat to
their control of the target corporation, managers have argued that joint
offers are just thinly disguised tender offers. Thus, the argument runs,
187. For example, in Armstrong World Industries' proxy contest with the Belzburg family's
First City Financial Corporation, Armstrong estimated its total expenditures relating to the in-
cumbents' solicitation of proxies at approximately $2 million. Proxy Statement of Armstrong
World Industries, Westlaw, SEC On Line at *20 (March 9, 1990). First City Financial almost
certainly incurred similar costs.
188. Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1104 (cited in note 1). These authors give the
example of management having the company pay additional (unnecessary) charges to a bank that
holds the company's stock in order to influence the bank's voting behavior in a proxy contest. Id.
For a Rights Plan, these costs would include the legal fees associated with creating or amending
the plan, any litigation costs incurred in fighting over its scope or validity, and the cost of creating
or redeeming the rights themselves.
189. Companies that do not have a majority of independent directors on their boards realize
stock price declines when they implement Rights Plans. See Black, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 901, 913
(cited in note 17).
190. See notes 13-21 and accompanying text for further discussion.
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tender offer defensive tactics should be available for use in responding
to joint offers.191
Legal scholars have engaged in a lively debate over the merits of
managerial defensive tactics in response to hostile tender offers.'9"
While a full discussion of this literature is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, the main arguments made about the use of tender offer defensive
tactics apply to their use in joint offers and therefore must be discussed
briefly.
Early commentators argued that tender offers were an important
mechanism for monitoring managerial performance.' Defensive tactics
should be sharply limited, 9 4 or even eliminated, 95 because they im-
peded tender offers that paid shareholders a premium for their shares
in the target company. 9 ' Scholars hotly disputed the propriety of al-
lowing management to use defensive tactics to search out competing
bids: Easterbrook and Fischel argued that discouraging competing bids
would maximize shareholder wealth because it increased the probability
that a tender offer would be made,197 while Gilson and Bebchuk sup-
191. When an acquirer makes a tender offer, incumbents have argued that the directors have
a duty to protect shareholders from any harm that these acquisitions may pose to them. See gener-
ally Apple Bancorp II C.A. No. 11510, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 121 (Aug. 9, 1990). Thus, if the
directors believe shareholders need a Rights Plan for protection against destructive tender offers,
but this plan has "incidental" adverse effects on proxy contests, the courts could ignore these
negative effects to protect shareholders from a greater harm. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1080. This argu-
ment is subject to the critical qualification, however, that the shareholders must retain the power
"to turn the board out" if the board's actions displease them. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 959. Dissatisfied
shareholders only retain the power to "turn the board out" if they can win a proxy contest or close
a tender offer.
192. See generally Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1161 (cited in note 166);
Easterbrook and Fischel, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 143); Gilson, 33 Stan. L. Rev. at 819
(cited in note 166); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender
Offer Defense, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case For Facilitating Compet-
ing Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23 (1982); Coffee, Jr., 84
Colum. L. Rev. at 1145 (cited in note 17); David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory
of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 153 (1986); David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey and Fred
S. McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701
(1987).
193. See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1173-74 (cited in note
166).
194. See, for example, Bebchuk, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at 24-25, 34-35; Gilson, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at
62-66.
195. See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1164; 1194-1204 (cited in
note 166).
196. See Bebchuk, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1034 (cited in note 192).
197. Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1177-82 (cited in note 166). The crux of
their position is that while permitting management to solicit competing bids may maximize share-
holder welfare after a dissident makes an offer, from an ex ante viewpoint, such a rule would
decrease the probability that a dissident will make a bid by driving up the premium that it must
pay in the tender offer. Id.
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ported facilitating competing bids to raise the premium that target
shareholders received in a tender offer.' 98 Finally, the two sides dis-
agreed over the impact of managerial defensive tactics on bidders' in-
centives to search for targets.'99
Later commentators have adopted stronger positions in favor of
management defensive tactics. For example, Haddock, Macey, and
McChesney argue that managers need stronger bargaining positions to
negotiate good deals for their shareholders. Denying managers the abil-
ity to resist tender offers leads to the bidder obtaining all of the value
created by the acquisition.2 0 0 This claim assumes that shareholders'
gains from management's improved bargaining more than offset their
potential losses from management's entrenching itself under the pre-
tense of forceful bargaining.
Another theory claims that managers need discretion to resist hos-
tile acquisitions to prevent shareholders from opportunistically reneg-
ing on implicit contractual agreements. 20 1 This theory views tender
offers as a means by which shareholders can deprive managers of the
benefits of agreements they have made with the board of directors and
argues that defensive tactics are a manager's best method of preventing
such action.202 Once again, however, the validity of this argument de-
pends crucially on the assumption that managers will not act oppor-
tunistically and abuse their discretion to deploy defensive tactics
against a tender offer that benefit themselves at the expense of target
shareholders.
These authors also appear to believe that target managers who engage in defensive tactics
rarely do so in the best interests of their shareholders. See Easterbrook and Fischel, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. at 1 (cited in note 143).
198. Bebchuk, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1050-56 (cited in note 192); Bebchuk, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at
45-50; Gilson, 33 Stan. L. Rev. at 865-75 (cited in note 166).
199. Easterbrook and Fischel objected to an auctioneering rule because they believed that it
would decrease search for potential targets and consequently decrease the number of offers. Eas-
terbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1177-78 (cited in note 166). Bebehuk and Gilson ac-
knowledged that bidding contests could decrease the amount of bidder search. They argued,
however, that an auction rule still would result in a significant amount of search and that searchers
could hedge against the risk of losing their sunk costs by buying shares in the target company.
Gilson, 33 Stan. L. Rev. at 870-75 (cited in note 166); Bebchuk, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at 30-33 (cited in
note 192).
200. Haddock, Macey and McChesney 73 Va. L. Rev. at 709 (cited in note 192); Leebron, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 153 (cited in note 192).
201. A successful tender offeror refusing to pay the managers of the target firm performance
bonuses that the outgoing board of directors had informally promised would provide one example
of this type of opportunistic behavior.
202. See Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellants, and Hostile Takeovers,
76 Am. Econ. Rev. 155 (1986); Haddock, Macey and McChesney, 73 Va. L. Rev. at 712-17 (cited in
note 192).
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Each of these arguments for and against management defensive
tactics to defeat hostile tender offers applies to joint offers. If Easter-
brook and Fischel's passivity thesis is accepted, no room remains for
management defensive tactics against joint offers. On the other hand, if
Bebchuk and Gilson's view is accepted, then courts should allow man-
agers to facilitate bidding contests in joint offers by using certain defen-
sive tactics. Similarly, the courts could apply Haddock, Macey, and
McChesney's arguments in favor of management defensive tactics in
the joint offer context.
However, one crucial additional qualification must be made to
these arguments in the joint offer context: shareholders must have an
opportunity to elect the representatives of their choice if directors' con-
trol over the corporation is to be legitimated. If the courts permit man-
agers to block tender offers, then annual elections of directors are the
shareholders' only remaining method of putting their chosen represent-
atives into power in the face of management opposition. If shareholders
have no means of removing unwanted management from power, the
temptations for managers to engage in self-interested behavior could be
irresistible. 0 8
Preserving shareholders' ability to control the management of their
property requires a more careful scrutiny of management defensive tac-
tics in joint offers than in naked tender offers. Not only will the courts
need to determine whether managers are acting in shareholders' best
interests in resisting an acquisition, but they also will have to balance
the impact of defensive tactics on shareholders' basic right to determine
who manages their property. An additional level of scrutiny must be
imposed before managers should be permitted to act in a way that
might absolutely preclude their removal.
The strength of management's claim that it is acting in sharehold-
ers' best interests will depend on the particular defensive tactic that it
deploys and the situation in which the tactic is used. For example, the
courts might allow the use of a mild defensive tactic, such as a short
delay in an annual meeting date, in the face of a joint offer when the
incumbents' claim is that the deployment of a defensive tactic allows
them to search for alternative transactions to maximize shareholder
value. 04 This delay must be only temporary, though, if the law is to
protect the shareholders' right to remove management. On the other
hand, when the dissident group seeks only a minority of the seats on
the board, and has no history of making control acquisitions (or faces
203. For an interesting article arguing that shareholder voting rights are not so fundamental,
see Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. Law. 461 (1992).
204. Apple Bancorp I, 579 A.2d 1115, 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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other legal obstacles to seeking control), little justification exists for
permitting the deployment of defensive tactics, such as a Rights Plan,
against their efforts.205
5. Summary
The weakness of the arguments in favor of defensive tactics in
proxy contests points to the conclusion that few legitimate threats to
the corporation justify management's use of a Rights Plan against dissi-
dent solicitations. When valid reasons exist for allowing management to
use Rights Plans, such as those put forward with respect to tender of-
fers, the case for using Rights Plans against joint offers is weaker than
with tender offers because these defensive measures may completely
preclude shareholders from determining who will manage their
investments.
The courts will need to balance legitimate threats to the corpora-
tion against the shareholders' right to control their investment in decid-
ing when they will permit Rights Plans to be used in proxy contests. In
conducting their balancing, the courts should have a strong presump-
tion in favor of protecting shareholders' ability to choose the best can-
didates in an unfettered election. The directors' claim that they know
what is best for the shareholders rings particularly hollow in a con-
tested election where incumbents have a vested interest in being re-
elected, and the shareholders have no other means of removing them
from power.20 6
Unfortunately, the courts' treatment of Rights Plans and their ap-
plication to dissident proxy solicitations have given managers too much
discretion. As discussed earlier, Rights Plans have a variety of negative
impacts on dissidents' election campaigns. Yet the courts have largely
downplayed these effects. Particularly when dissidents have com-
menced a joint offer, the courts have failed to protect shareholders'
ability to remove unwanted managers and instead have allowed the in-
cumbents to manipulate unfairly the outcome of corporate elections.
Part IV looks at how the existing judicial tests for defensive tactics in
proxy contests could be improved.
205. Gilson and Kraakman, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 903-04 n.145 (cited in note 17).
206. See, for example, Bebchuk and Kahan, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1077 (cited in note 1):
Incumbents tend to have self-interested motives for maintaining control: they want to retain
the private benefits (such as high salaries and perks) that are associated with exercising con-
trol. Their interest in preserving their own control might exceed any interest they have in
letting better managers run the company.
Id.
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IV. WHEN IS A RIGHTS PLAN RIGHT IN A PROXY CONTEST?
In evaluating the use of Rights Plans in proxy contests, the courts
have, under various rubrics, 0 7 balanced the incumbents' interest in pro-
tecting the corporation and its shareholders from harm and a Rights
Plan's negative effect on a dissident's chances of winning a proxy con-
test.20 8 The courts have placed the burden on incumbents to justify de-
fensive tactics because of their potential for misuse as entrenchment
devices. However, to date, judicial review has been highly deferential to
the incumbents' use of Rights Plans, despite their adverse impact on a
dissident's chances of winning a proxy contest. While a balancing test
such as that developed in Unocal is appropriate in evaluating these
competing interests, judges must be careful in applying it to examine
critically incumbents' use of Rights Plans to impede free elections.
For a Unocal-type test to be effective, the courts will need guid-
ance in discriminating between different types of defensive tactics. In
particular, they need to know what threats constitute legitimate bases
for defensive tactics in a proxy contest. Once these threats have been
delineated, the courts will need to judge whether the incumbents' de-
fensive tactics are an appropriate response to the threat. In making this
decision, the courts must measure the impact of defensive tactics on a
dissident's chances of winning a proxy contest. Finally, as with other
defensive tactics, management's inherent interest in retaining its office
should lead the courts to require them to shoulder the burden of per-
suasion that the defensive tactics' adverse impact on a dissident's proxy
solicitation is justifiable. The court will need to know how heavy they
should make incumbents' burden of persuasion. This Part develops this
framework to examine Rights Plans' application in proxy contests and
joint offers critically.
A. What Threats Justify Deploying Rights Plans in Proxy
Contests?
Proxy contests pose four "threats" to shareholders' interests2 9 that
might justify incumbents' deployment of Rights Plans against dissident
207. See note 88 for further discussion of the equivalence of the various tests that the courts
have applied to Rights Plans that adversely affect a dissident's chances of winning a proxy contest.
208. In this balancing test, the courts must use their "independent judgment in balancing
the reasonable skepticism of shareholders (which considered alone would suggest prohibiting
preclusive [defensive] tactics) against the presumptive expertise of managers (which considered
alone would suggest blanket business judgment protection of preclusive [defensive] tactics.)" Gil-
son and Kraakman, 44 Bus. Law. at 266 (cited in note 51).
209. After Paramount, it could be argued that the courts should consider "threats" to the
corporation's and other stakeholders' interests in determining whether to permit defensive tactics
in a proxy contest. Compare Apple Bancorp I 579 A.2d at 1123 n.9. If this were true, then the
1993]
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election campaigns: information imperfections; self-interested small
shareholder victories; potential wealth decreasing effects of proxy con-
tests; and hostile tender offers. The first argument, that shareholders
have inadequate information and lack incentives to gather more, points
toward encouraging shareholders to become better informed and to re-
moving any obstacles that stand in the way of informing them. Rights
Plans, which can obstruct information flows between shareholders,
would only exacerbate this information problem and should not be per-
mitted on this basis.
The claim that proxy contests should be impeded because victori-
ous small shareholders will engage in self-interested diversions of corpo-
rate resources, the second potential justification for using Rights Plans
against proxy contests, ignores the dissidents' need to persuade other
wealth-maximizing shareholders of the merits of their efforts. Given the
difficulty of convincing disinterested institutions to vote against man-
agement, and the incumbents' substantial advantages stemming from
their control of the proxy mechanism, little need exists for deploying
Rights Plans to impede small shareholders' efforts to persuade other
shareholders to join them in unseating management.
The claim that proxy contests are inefficient and decrease social
wealth does not support the use of Rights Plans in proxy contests. The
available data, while not conclusive, suggest the opposite conclusion,
that is, that proxy contests increase target company shareholders'
wealth. Furthermore, Rights Plans are costly to create and can depress
the value of shareholders' investments.21 °
The fourth category of justifications, that Rights Plans serve to de-
ter hostile tender offers, is the most frequently advanced by the courts
in support of the use of Rights Plans in proxy contests.2 11 The courts
already have issued some guidelines concerning the scope of this threat.
At the one end of the spectrum, Moran held that management could
use Rights Plans to stop dissidents from accumulating more than
twenty percent of the target's stock in a proxy contest.21 2 Without this
restriction, the court found, Rights Plans would be an ineffective de-
fense against tender offers. At the other end of the spectrum, the courts
incumbent board could maintain itself in power indefinitely by creating a long-term business plan
and claiming that a dissident's election campaign constituted a threat to the plan and to the corpo-
ration's and stakeholders' long-term best interests. Paramount's reaffirmation that the sharehold-
ers have the ultimate right to vote out the incumbent directors strongly indicates that the courts
would not sanction this subterfuge.
210. See notes 187-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
211. Of course, if one concludes that the courts should not permit management to use defen-
sive tactics in response to a tender offer, as Easterbrook and Fischel argue, then no room exists for
defensive tactics in proxy contests based on these justifications.
212. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
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consistently have held that tender offer defensive tactics must allow
shareholders the opportunity to vote management out of office 213 and
that the threat of losing an election does not justify the use of defensive
tactics in a proxy contest.214
Proponents have suggested three distinct rationales for using
Rights Plans against tender offers that might vindicate incumbents' use
of Rights Plans against proxy contests. The first, that management
needs a Rights Plan to gain enough leverage to negotiate with a poten-
tial acquirer, or to shop the firm to other bidders,21 5 has some validity
for proxy contests and joint offers. This is especially true when the dis-
sidents' platform is that they intend to sell off or restructure the com-
pany. If management can bring in a third-party bidder at a higher
price, or induce the dissident to promise a more attractive subsequent
acquisition, then the target company shareholders will benefit from giv-
ing them the opportunity to do so.2 18
The second rationale is that Rights Plans can insulate a target
company's shareholders from structurally coercive tender offers that
treat tendering and nontendering shareholders differently.2 Structural
coercion occurs when, as in a front-end-loaded, two-tiered tender offer,
the bid's unequal treatment of shareholders forces shareholders to ac-
cept the offer to avoid the adverse consequences of refusal. With proxy
contests, this threat seems attenuated. If a dissident proposed to treat
shareholders differently after being elected, adversely impacted share-
holders would vote against the dissident slate, the opposite result than
with a coercive tender offer.
The third justification for using Rights Plans to stop tender offers
is the risk of substantive coercion, or that shareholders might accept an
inadequate tender offer because they do not believe management's ac-
curate representations about the long-term (higher) value of the target
company. 2 8 The Rights Plan acts to preserve the target company's in-
dependence and to permit existing management to raise the value of its
shares above the level proposed by the hostile bidder.21 9 The crux of
213. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
214. See, for example, Sutton, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 85 at *1.
215. Gilson and Kraakman, 44 Bus. Law. at 261 (cited in note 51). When shareholders are
dispersed and incapable of a coordinated response to a tender offer, they may need management to
serve as their negotiator to gain a larger share of the gains from the transaction. Id.
216. The knowledge that incumbents will be free to engage in such a search may discourage
some potential rival candidates from deciding to launch a proxy solicitation. See notes 193-99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this problem in the tender offer literature.
217. See Gilson and Kraakman, 44 Bus. Law. at 261. They define structural coercion as "the
risk that disparate treatment of non-tendering shareholders might distort shareholders' tender de-
cisions." Id. at 267.
218. Id. at 267.
219. Id. at 262.
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this claim is that management can truthfully make the claim that they
will improve performance but that shareholders do not believe them. 220
For proxy contests, substantive coercion amounts to a claim that
shareholders will mistakenly vote for the dissidents even though man-
agement correctly tells its shareholders that it can improve the com-
pany's performance if given more time.221 Again, this claim seems
weaker than with tender offers. Management has ample opportunity
and incentives to inform shareholders of its plans and expectations
about the future value of the company and to criticize the dissidents'
proposals. Management can even copy the dissidents' platform and
credibly argue that they are better able to execute it than any outsiders.
Furthermore, shareholders have less incentive to rush to embrace the
dissidents' election platform than they do to sell their shares at a pre-
mium price in a tender offer. They will be more critical of untried plans
to run the company than of the prospect of an immediate cash payout.
However, empirical studies have found disturbing evidence that
when dissidents succeed in winning proxy contests at poorly performing
companies, and no subsequent restructuring or sale of the company
takes place, the performance of the company declines markedly.222 This
evidence could support the claim that at least in some cases, sharehold-
ers do vote for the wrong candidates and that they would be better off
if management had used preclusive defensive tactics, such as a Rights
Plan that prohibited dissidents from receiving revocable proxies.223 The
courts cannot rule out substantive coercion as a possible threat to
shareholders. 2 4
B. Analyzing the Impact of Rights Plans on Dissident Election
Campaigns: Common Sense and Statistics
Once the incumbents have articulated the threats posed by the dis-
sidents' election campaign, the court must weigh the use of the Rights
Plan against its impact on a dissident's ability to win a proxy contest to
determine if the defensive response to this threat is proportionate. The
220. Id. A legitimate claim of substantive coercion requires the incumbents to show how and
when they can improve the company's performance. Id. at 268.
221. This is similar to Bebchuk and Kahan's argument that information problems can result
in inefficient dissidents winning proxy contests. See Part II.C.1. for further discussion of this
point.
222. See notes 171-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of these studies.
223. See Sutton, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 85 at *1.
224. In passing on a claim of substantive coercion, a court should consider managements
expertise, the specificity and completeness of its plans, the firm's performance history, expert testi-
mony, the target board's deliberations about the plans, and any prior history about management's
claims of substantive coercion in other takeover attempts. Gilson and Kraakman, 44 Bus. Law. at
271 (cited in note 51).
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answer to this question requires an analysis of what impact the Rights
Plan has on a dissident's chances of winning a contest. If Rights Plans
have little or no impact, then they could be applied without concern.
On the other hand, if Rights Plans have a significant negative effect on
dissident success, then the courts will need to look more closely at in-
cumbents' justifications for using them.
How can courts determine the impact of a proposed defensive tac-
tic on a dissident's chances of winning a proxy contest? A judge should
consider several different types of evidence, ranging from common
sense and simple statistics to sophisticated economic analyses.225 The
impact of Rights Plans on dissident proxy solicitations illustrates how
these several forms of analysis would fit together.
At the simplest level, summary statistics will give a judge a good
indication of what effects Rights Plans (or other defensive tactics) are
likely to have on the outcome of proxy contests. For example, when a
Rights Plans has a trigger level that is below the level of dissidents'
average holdings in proxy contests, common sense indicates that this
will have a negative impact on a dissident's chances of winning a proxy
contest."'
A court could ask the parties to conduct a study of the average size
of dissident stockholdings. Alternatively, the court could refer to ex-
isting studies on this question. Good information exists about the aver-
age level of dissident stockholdings in proxy contests. Pound's study of
100 proxy contests (including issue contests) during the period of 1981-
225. The courts' ability to recognize and properly use extralegal information, such as statisti-
cal studies, in deciding cases has been the subject of much legal commentary. See, for example,
Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1011 (1990); J.
Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions, 25 L. & Soc. Rev. 155
(1991); Peggy Davis, There is a Book Out: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative
Facts, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1539 (1987); John Monahan and Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Ob-
taining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (1986); Lau-
rens Walker and John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va.
L. Rev. 559 (1987); Laurens Walker and John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as
Legal Precedent, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 877 (1988).
The use of special studies or other evidence introduced by the parties (or the court's own
expert) to determine a particular fact at issue in the case, in this instance the impact of a particu-
lar Rights Plan on a particular dissident's proxy solicitation campaign, is an adjudicative or social
fact use of data. See Saks, 75 Iowa L. Rev. at 1025. If, however, the court chooses to rely upon
general knowledge, such as studies done by third parties on the impact of Rights Plans on proxy
contests, to make particular determinations in a case, this is a social framework use of the informa-
tion. Id. at 1020. The issue becomes what do these studies tell the court about the particular
application of the particular Rights Plan at issue in the case. The appellate courts generally sub-
ject social frameworks, and the methodologies of case-specific studies used to find social facts, to
de novo review, while subjecting adjudicative facts to the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 1030.
226. In doing their jobs, judges must take account of the way that the world works. Common
sense, or knowledge that seems so apparently true that it seems intuitively obvious, is one of a
judge's sources of information. Id. at 1015.
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1985 found that dissidents' average stockholdings were about twelve
percent of the total equity of the target company.227 Thomas and Mar-
tin's more recent study of eighty-nine control contests from 1985-1991
found that average dissident stockholdings were 11.4%.228
The implication of these studies is that a Rights Plan with a trigger
level below ten percent (or even fifteen percent) would force many dis-
sidents to hold less stock than they would otherwise have chosen to
hold. Decreased levels of dissident stock ownership will require dissi-
dents to find more support from other stockholders. This will translate
into a more difficult struggle to win a proxy contest. Pound's research
confirms that lower levels of dissident stock ownership decrease the
likelihood that a dissident will win a proxy contest.229
The upshot of this crude analysis indicates that the courts should
prohibit Rights Plans with low (ten to fifteen percent) trigger levels.
Several courts have enjoined Rights Plans with low trigger levels on the
grounds that they would adversely affect dissident election campaigns,
albeit without explicitly stating how they reached this conclusion.230
To supplement this reliance on simple statistics, and to look at
more subtle effects of some defensive tactics, the courts will need to
rely on more sophisticated statistical studies. More explicit and rigorous
treatment of statistical evidence would improve the courts' analysis of
the effects of Rights Plans on proxy contests.
Traditionally, the courts have relied on the parties to introduce ev-
idence on such questions.21 However, in several key cases, notably Mo-
ran and Apple Bancorp II, this has left the court without an adequate
record when the parties failed to introduce important evidence.
Moran illustrates how an incomplete, partisan record can result in
a court reaching dubious conclusions about the impact of Rights Plans
on proxy contests. In Moran, the Court evaluated a Rights Plan's im-
pact on a dissident's chances of winning a proxy contest by relying
solely on a study done by Georgeson & Co., a professional proxy solici-
tation firm, and the testimony of one of its officers. 22 The Georgeson
227. Pound, 20 J. Fin. Econ. at 252 (cited in note 2).
228. Thomas and Martin, Working Paper at 29 (cited in note 137).
229. Pound, 20 J. Fin. Econ. at 261.
230. See, for example, Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1986). See also Avon, 738 F. Supp. at 686 (discussing the New York statute authorizing Rights
Plans with trigger levels of 20% and higher).
231. With respect to Rights Plans, this evidence might include sophisticated statistical anal-
yses like Pound's study discussed below. Alternatively, the courts could admit the testimony of
proxy solicitors.
232. In its study, Georgeson assembled data on 96 of the estimated 122 proxy contests that
took place from 1981-1984. Georgeson & Co., Inc., Report on Proxy Contests: January 1, 1981-
September 28, 1984 (the "Georgeson 1984 Report").
[Vol. 46:503554
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vand. L. Rev.  554 1993
DEFENSIVE TACTICS
witness stated that the Georgeson 1984 Report showed there was "no
correlation between the size of an insurgent's holdings and the likeli-
hood of success" by a dissident in a proxy contest.2 3 3 Relying on this
document, the Court found that the likelihood the Rights Plan would
frustrate shareholders' efforts to conduct a proxy solicitation was
"highly conjectural. '234
A closer examination of the Georgeson 1984 Report shows its sig-
nificance was much less clear. The Report contains no rigorous statisti-
cal analysis of the data presented. The Report calculates only a few
descriptive statistics and these simply show that some dissident groups
holding less than twenty percent of a target company's stock have won
proxy contests.3 5 To reach an informed decision, the Court needed a
more complete record on which to base its analysis.
At the time of the Moran decision, no empirical work had been
done to estimate the impact of Rights Plans on the outcome of proxy
contests. Since that time, two studies have been conducted that subse-
quent courts could rely on in making determinations about the effects
of Rights Plans on proxy contests. Pound's study of 100 proxy contests
(including issue contests) in the period 1981-1985 examined the impact
of a twenty percent trigger level on the likelihood of a dissident winning
a proxy contest.236 Pound found that successful dissidents hold on aver-
age about twelve percent of a target company's shares. He concluded
that this evidence "suggests that a number of recent takeover defense
innovations, which set a threshold level for dissident ownership at
twenty percent, do not preclude a successful proxy fight".237 At the very
least, however, Pound's study indicates that a Rights Plan with a trig-
ger level of ten percent, or even fifteen percent, would adversely impact
dissidents' chances of winning a proxy contest.
233. Instead, he claimed that "the merit of an insurgent's cause rather than the size of his
holdings [is] the key to success." Moran, 490 A.2d at 1079.
234. Id. at 1080.
235. Georgeson 1984 Report § 4, at 1 (cited in note 232). The Report limited its analysis to a
single page summary of two statistical comparisons. The first comparison showed that the percent-
age of contests won by shareholders holding more than 20% of a target company's stock was ap-
proximately the same as the percentage of contests won by shareholders holding less than 20% of
the target company's stock. The second statistical comparison stated that "dissidents controlling
less than 10% of the voting power won approximately 36% of the time, while dissidents controlling
20% of the voting power won only 27% of the time." Id.
These conclusions ignore the impact of voting power on settlements in proxy contests. If con-
tests ending in settlements are considered, then the data show that dissidents with more than 20%
of the stock are 50% more likely to win a proxy contest or force a settlement than dissidents with
less than 20% of the stock. Ronald E. Schrager, Corporate Conflicts: Proxy Fights in the 1980s 48
(Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc., 1986).
236. Pound, 20 J. Fin. Econ. at 237 (cited in note 2)
237. Id. at 261.
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Thomas and Martin's more recent study uses data on eighty-nine
proxy contests from 1985-1991 and finds that the presence of a Rights
Plan signals dissident stockholders that a company is a potential candi-
date for a proxy contest.238 More significantly, Thomas and Martin find
that Rights Plan trigger levels below twenty percent have a significant
negative effect on dissident stock ownership.3 9
These studies strongly suggest that while the Moran court correctly
recognized that a flip-over Rights Plan with a twenty percent trigger
would have little effect on most dissidents' proxy solicitation efforts,
other courts should not uncritically adopt this conclusion for other
types of Rights Plans. Unfortunately, some later decisions cite Moran
as having definitively established that all Rights Plans have an immate-
rial effect on dissidents' chances of winning a proxy contest.240
To the extent that the courts are unable to find adequate statistical
studies on which to base informed determinations about the effects of
defensive tactics on proxy contests, and the parties fail (as they have in
most cases) to provide an adequate record on which to base this judg-
ment, then the courts should consider appointing their own expert to
evaluate the impact of the defensive tactic. 241 The federal courts have
made such appointments under the authority granted them by Federal
Rule of Evidence 706.42 A recent study by the Federal Judicial Center
estimates that twenty percent of federal district court judges have ap-
pointed their own experts.243 The Delaware Supreme Court recently has
proposed that trial courts consider using court-appointed expert wit-
nesses to provide them with a more objective analysis.2 44
The court could appoint an expert based on nominations from the
parties or select one on its own. The court would need to appoint these
experts sufficiently in advance of trial to allow a hearing on the ap-
pointment, to determine the duties of the expert, and to provide the
expert with sufficient time to prepare an analysis for the court and the
parties. The expert should advise the parties of all findings and submit
to depositions.245 At trial, either party may call the witness, or the court
238. Thomas and Martin, Working Paper at 25 (cited in note 137).
239. Id. at 25-26. One implication of these results is that the courts should generally strike
down incumbents' attempts to amend existing Rights Plans to lower their trigger levels below
twenty percent.
240. See, for example, Apple Bancorp 1 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS.121 at *43.
241. See Saks, 75 Iowa L. Rev. at 1028 (cited in note 225).
242. Fed. R. Evid. 706 advisory committee's note. See also United States v. Green, 544 F.2d
138, 145 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting "the inherent power of a trial judge to appoint an expert of his own
choosing is clear").
243. Jonathan M. Moses, Judges Call In Their Own Experts To Aid Court On Technical
Issues, Wall St. J. B8, col. 1 (July 2, 1992).
244. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Company, 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992).
245. Id. at *30.
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would call the witness if necessary. The expert should be paid by the
parties in the manner in which the court determines is appropriate.246
Once the court has determined the effect of the particular Rights
Plan on dissidents' chances of winning a proxy contest, it still must ask
whether the incumbents have produced sufficient evidence that defen-
sive tactics benefit target company shareholders to justify their negative
effect on shareholder voting rights.
C. Incumbents' Burden to Justify Using Rights Plans (and Other
Defensive Tactics) in Proxy Contests
Once a court has found that a proxy contest poses a legitimate
threat to a company's shareholders, and that the proposed defensive
tactic has an adverse impact on a dissident's proxy solicitation cam-
paign, it still needs to decide if the proposed defense makes the target
company's shareholders better off. Under the existing judicial tests, the
incumbents have the burden of producing evidence to show that they
acted in the shareholders' best interests in deploying defensive tactics.
However, once the incumbents produce evidence that, after a reasona-
ble investigation, they acted in good faith in what they believed to be
shareholders' or the corporation's best interests, the burden of persua-
sion shifts back to the dissident.247
Incumbents should retain the burden of persuading the court that
any proposed defensive tactic benefits the target company's sharehold-
ers. Shareholders' right to control their investments through the exer-
cise of the franchise is a critical part of the corporate contract in a
change of control situation.248 This is particularly true today with the
demise of the tender offer and the increased use of indexing by large
institutional shareholders. If the courts want to prevent the complete
separation of ownership and control, they cannot permit incumbents to
block or impede the shareholders' exercise of their franchise in change
of control situations.
246. Id. at *31. The use of experts can be costly. In a recent case involving complex computer
software copyright issues, the court paid its expert $4500 per day. Moses, Wall St. J. at B8 (cited
in note 243).
247. See Part II.C.1. for further discussion. The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Stroud v. Grace may require incumbents to offer better justifications for using defensive tactics
that adversely impact the shareholder franchise in a contest for control. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92
n.3 (saying that "[a] board's unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure touching 'upon issues
of control' that purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders is strongly suspect under Unocal, and
cannot be sustained without a 'compelling justification' "). It is too early to tell if the court in-
tended to impose a heavier burden on incumbents to justify defensive tactics in proxy contests or
if the requirement that the board be acting to "purposefully disenfranchise" stockholders will be
so difficult to prove that this standard is never invoked.
248. See Part III.B. for further discussion of this point.
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Moreover, many of the theoretical arguments in favor of these de-
fensive tactics are weak. The claim that victorious small shareholders
are likely to reduce the value of target corporations ignores the impor-
tance of informed voting patterns by large institutional shareholders.
Similarly, the increased concentration of share-ownership has amelio-
rated the information problem justification for defensive tactics offered
by Bebchuk and Kahan.2 49 Furthermore, stockholders appear to accrue
significant benefits from proxy contests.50
The only arguments that might justify the use of defensive tactics
in proxy contests and joint offers are those advanced in favor of block-
ing tender offers. For example, a court might permit incumbents to use
a Rights Plan to delay a joint offer so that the board can solicit other
alternative transactions for shareholders to create an auction for the
company. Management could rationalize this tactic as a response to a
threat of substantive coercion if it believed that it could do a better job
of selling the company or restructuring it than could the dissidents.
In a pure proxy contest, management could justify those provisions
of Rights Plans that have only a minor negative impact on a dissident's
campaign as necessary to stop the threats created by tender offers,
much as the Moran court found. However, the courts should adopt a
per se rule against those provisions of Rights Plans that are designed
solely to impede proxy contests. Thus, for example, a court should au-
tomatically strike down any provisions that would limit dissident share-
holders' ability to accept revocable proxies.251
Management cannot justify terms in Rights Plans that the drafters
designed primarily to stop proxy contests as reasonable responses to
any threat. Courts should scrutinize preclusive defensive tactics partic-
ularly closely because of the danger of entrenching management perma-
nently in office. A per se rule invalidating these restrictions would stop
incumbents from using frivolous litigation to tie up dissidents and to
delay their proxy campaigns. It also would strengthen shareholders'
ability to exercise their rights to remove unwanted managers.
In practice, how would the courts apply these rules to Rights Plans'
application in proxy contests? Suppose that in a joint offer, the target
company's Rights Plan's definition of beneficial ownership was being
used to block a dissident shareholder group's attempts to communicate
with other shareholders. The incumbents might state that these restric-
tions were needed to prevent shareholders from mistakenly accepting
249. See Part 11..C.1. for further discussion of this point.
250. See notes 166-76 and accompanying text for further discussion of this point.
251. See, for example, Sutton, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 85 at *2-3.
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the dissidents' tender offer when existing management could raise the
value of the company above the price offered by the dissidents.
The courts should demand that the incumbents prove that the
Rights Plan's restrictions would have little or no impact on the dissi-
dent group's election campaign. If the incumbents can produce statisti-
cal proof, or persuasive expert witness testimony, to show that this is
true, the likelihood that their actions are aimed at entrenching them-
selves in office seems remote. Even if they are trying to entrench them-
selves, this evidence would show that the Rights Plan will not help
them to do so.
If the Rights Plan's terms had a significant negative effect on a
dissident group's ability to make its case to the shareholders, and were
not a necessary part of its tender offer defenses, the court would invali-
date the infringing provisions without further investigation. This seems
particularly true when the defensive tactic interferes with a shareholder
group's ability to communicate with other shareholders or with other
important voting rights, such as the right to nominate candidates, or
the right to communicate with other shareholders.252 Here, restricting
shareholders' ability to communicate with each other seems unlikely to
benefit them. A court should strike down this type of application of a
Rights Plan.253
If the suspect provisions of the Rights Plan were central to the
Rights Plan's use as a tender offer defense, then incumbent manage-
ment would still need to show that these terms directly benefited the
target company's shareholders. The likelihood that incumbents are act-
ing to entrench themselves now appears quite high. Only when manage-
ment can make a strong case that the Rights Plan will directly improve
252. In this regard, the courts might want to determine the significance of the voting rights
at issue with an expanded version of Chancellor Allen's distinction between a constitutional right
to vote and other voting rights in Lennane v. ASK Computer Systems, Inc., No. 11744, 1990 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 164 (Oct. 11, 1990). In Lennane, the chancellor wrote that the right to vote is constitu-
tional when "the corporation law statute, the certificate of the corporation or the company's by-
laws creates a right to vote on a matter." Id. These rights are entitled to great deference by the
directors. Id.
The courts would need to expand this distinction in the context of proxy contests to take into
account the importance of the voting rights to a dissident's chances of winning a proxy contest.
For example, the right to nominate directors, the right to timely access to a stockholders' list, and
the right to get proposals on the meeting agenda, all have a major impact on a dissident's chances
of winning a contest. See, for example, Gordon, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 361-63 (cited in note 10)
(discussing the importance of agenda control in determining the outcome of voting process). The
courts should carefully scrutinize defensive tactics that infringe on any of these crucial voting
rights.
253. See Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., C.A. No. 9569 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 11, 1988).
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the target company shareholders' welfare, such as through a sale to a
third party, should the courts approve the use of a Rights Plan.
As this example shows, this test would give the courts a flexible
and fact-sensitive method of determining when to permit Rights Plans'
use in proxy contests. Contestants would quickly litigate and settle the
validity of the more common uses of Rights Plans. Courts could analyze
new wrinkles in the use of Rights Plans (and other defensive tactics) in
new and unexpected situations more readily.
V. CONCLUSION
Incumbent management has long enjoyed broad discretion in its
use of Rights Plans in proxy contests and joint offers. Legal scholars
have accepted the justifications for permitting incumbents such latitude
with little comment. The courts also have largely deferred to manage-
ment's decisions about how they use Rights Plans against dissident
shareholder groups.
The analysis presented here argues that courts should apply
stricter standards. A more stringent balancing test that forces incum-
bents to justify the use of Rights Plans by explaining how the Rights
Plan prevents a specific harm to their shareholders would better protect
shareholders from abusive defensive tactics. For any particular defen-
sive tactic, a court must question the explanations offered by incum-
bents and place the burden of persuasion on management to show that
they are acting in shareholders' best interest.
The courts should invalidate without further judicial inquiry those
provisions of Rights Plans that are directed primarily toward impeding
dissidents' proxy campaigns. Courts should permit Rights Plans in
proxy contests only when the incumbents can show that the contests
are necessary parts of the company's tender offer defense, that their
impact on the outcome of a proxy contest will be minimal, and that
direct benefits to the target company shareholders justify their adverse
effects on dissidents' election campaigns.
To determine the impact of particular defensive measures on the
outcome of proxy contests, the courts should demand that the parties
submit statistical evidence and expert testimony about the effects of
Rights Plans on the outcome of the proxy contest. Only after examining
the impact of the defensive tactic on the outcome of the proxy contests,
and finding it justified by the benefit to the target company's share-
holders, should a court approve any use of Rights Plans in proxy con-
tests. When the incumbents fail to carry this burden, then the court
should strike down these defenses and permit shareholders to exercise
their vote in corporate elections freely and without restraint.
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